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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of essays on the important problems in developing
countries and aims to contribute to the empirical literature on the i) financial
services sector expansion and its implications on formal employment, i) impact of
early retirement incentives on labour force participation rates and finally on the
iii) effectiveness of stabilization funds on reducing the boom and bust cycles in
light of fluctuating international commodity prices.
Chapter 1 investigates the role of financial services expansion, especially the
impact of increase in consumer credits on the reduction of informal employment. I
argue that liberalization should naturally lead to a decline in the share of informal
employment due to the fact that international firms are less likely to employ infor-
mally and consumers whose borrowing constraints are relaxed due to more credit
availability are more likely to prefer goods that are paid with consumer credits. I
test this hypothesis by exploiting the regional variation in Turkey. Due to the pos-
sible endogeneity problem, I employ several instruments and find positive impact
of consumer services expansion on formal employment. Two unique datasets that
I explore for for possible instruments are i) the religiosity and political tendencies
surveys of 2011 and 2013, and ii) regional Armenian population loss data between
1914-1917 in the former Ottoman Empire that preceded the Turkish Republic.
The exogenous variation that I seek to explore accordingly are; i) Islam bans all
sorts of interest charges in financial transactions and therefore residents of more
conservative regions are on average less likely to demand consumer credits, and
ii) Armenians were the trading and artisan class of the Empire and therefore the
main users of the financial instruments and when they perished.
Chapter 2 is about the impact of a Social Security System that allowed women
and men to retire as early as 38 and 44 years old on labour supply decisions in
Turkey. Before the pension reform of 1999, the Law 3774, dated 1992 brought
incentives to those individuals who several conditions to retire at a much earlier
age than the conventional 60-65 years window. Using the Statistics on Income and
Living Condition (SILC) panel dataset between 2007-2010 in a Fuzzy Regression
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Continuity Design, we find that these incentives let to an average decline of about
16.9 hours in weekly hours worked by men aged 44-52 and 20.6 hours decline
in weekly hours worked by women who are aged between 39-49 in a bandwidth
of three years around the eligible age for retirement. Moreover, we find that the
entitlement for retirement after 44 years old reduced the probability of labour force
participation of men by about 28% to 37% while we did not find a statistically
meaningful impact on the participation decisions of women.
Chapter 3 explores whether sovereign wealth or stabilization funds created by
governments in oil rich countries are effective in reducing volatility and ensuring
a counter-cyclical or acyclical fiscal policy in line with the optimal fiscal policy
literature or whether they are just another government account in practise. The
existing literature on the effectiveness of stabilization funds suffers from endogene-
ity problems, namely i) the endogeneity between gdp and government expenditures
and ii) the endogenity of the decision to establish stabilization funds. In this pa-
per, I contribute to the literature by addressing both of these problems by using a
series of Two Stage Least Square Estimations and find positive evidence in favour
of stabilization funds in reducing volatility and pro-cyclicality of the fiscal policy in
oil rich countries. The findings are relevant for the wider discussion of the procycli-
cality in developing countries, as one third of the countries which are documented
to improve fiscal policy cyclicality seem to be the ones that are resource rich and
have a stabilization fund in place.
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Chapter 1
Expansion of Consumer Credits and
Formal Employment: The Case of
Turkey
1.1 Introduction
Informal employment is an important labour market problem in most develop-
ing countries. They have implications on limiting collection of public tax revenues
and on creating a wedges in labour markets. This paper is not concerned with the
underlying reasons of informality, instead questions the impact of financial services
expansion on formal employment, if there is any. The claim is that along a phase
of globalization and financial integration in a developing country, the increase in
consumer credits, credit card services and other financial services might have pos-
itive externalities on formal employment through the electronization of payments
system. It is possible to describe the impact working through three main channels.
First, the new consumption environment with economies of scale brought by the
expansion of domestic and international retail chains, and conglomeration of stores
around shopping malls combined with more consumer credit availability might nat-
urally necessitate the formalization of transactions and employment procedures.1
1We define formality as paid employment with registration in social security system.
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Rapid urbanization, modernization of the economy and automation of the value
chain benefit the sales of larger enterprises with comparative advantage dispropor-
tionately more and hence changes the mode of spending to the disadvantage of old
fashion local shops or enterprises. This effect is amplified by financial liberalization
and rapid banking sector growth which facilitates access to consumer credits and
credit cards for more income groups in the population, and not just for the rich.
Therefore, overall, not only the mode of consumption spending has changed, but
also the mode of expenditure financing by the consumers have changed in many
fast growing economies. Second, increasing inclusiveness of financial services as
well as electronization of payments might have the implication that the workers
are more likely to demand formal contracts as one usually needs proof of income for
access to loans. And third, monitoring payments and expenditures through credit
cards and electronic system is a more effective way of combatting with informality
for the government and therefore most governments improve the regulations and
infrastructure in order to spread the use of electronic payment technologies.
Penetration of financial services among the population therefore, should have
positive externalities on lowering informality as it incorporates those three impor-
tant modernizing trends in the economy. The hypothesis in this paper is that the
decline in the informality (about 9-10 percentage points in both manufacturing
and service sectors) in the last years was partly due to financial services enlarge-
ment in the Turkish economy. An important reason why I focus on the financial
services and consumer credit expansion as opposed to the loans extended to firms
is that in developing countries financial services sector expansion might yield more
immediate benefits for consumers than it does for firms. Evidence shows that in
many developing countries, the small and medium size firms (SMEs) still prefer
own sources as opposed to bank credit for financing of investments and working
capital. World Bank’s Investment Climate Assesment (ICA) for Egypt shows that
the percentage of firms which have bank loans were 11.4% in 2008 (which actually
fell down from 17.4% in 2004).2 The same survey for Turkey shows that only half
of the firms surveyed had loans in 2009 whereas an average person holds more
than one credit card at a time as we will explain in more detail in section 3.3 Low
2http://www.aucegypt.edu/research/src/Documents/Egypt ICA Policy Brief.pdf
3http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/1253714309r3973.Turkey Investment Climate Assessment Vol I.pdf
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rates of bank borrowing by firms in some middle income countries might be due to
the fact that bank financing could be more costly for SMEs or it could be due to
different risk perceptions. Hence, if financial services expansion has an impact on
formal employment, impact coming from consumer services might be as important
as the firm credit channel.
The impact of increased consumer credit availability and financial services on
formal employment is largely overlooked. A new book by Cull et al. (2013) focuses
on the on empirical foundations of financial inclusion across countries. The premise
of the book is built upon the study by Honohan (2008), who documents that the
number of adults who do not use formal or semi-formal financial services glob-
ally is approximately 2.5 billion against the 2.2 billion users. Although the book
shreds light upon various channels through which expanding the financial services
might improve the lifes of billions, very little attention is paid to the changing
composition of formal-informal employment in relation to banking growth. The
closest study in the literature to the view of my research is by Catao, Pages and
Rosales (2009) which explores the link between firm credit and formalization in
Brazil. The study focuses on the firms’ decision to formalize and conjectures that
firms need not only to be formally registered to borrow credit but also need to
comply with considerable requirements about their balance sheets, income flows,
tax reliabilities. Since the strengthening of the communication and data gathering
technologies allow governments to monitor more effectively and limit illegal bor-
rowing activities, the study tests the empirical relevance of the credit channel as
a driving force of formality. Using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) financial depen-
dence methodology, Catao, Pages and Rosales (2009) test whether the economic
sectors that are more dependent on domestic bank credit are the ones where for-
mal employment expands faster as the terms of access to bank credit improve.
The study finds that as the aggregate supply of formal bank credit increases, for-
malization rate increases faster in the sectors that are more dependent on bank
credits.
A related branch of the literature that is somewhat parallel to the research
question in this paper is the relationship between the trade liberalization, financial
liberalization and informality. This wave of literature mostly focuses on the man-
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ufacturing sector, attaching less importance on the implications for the services
sector. The parallelity of this literature with my paper is based on the observation
that after a period of trade liberalization, multinational firms and chains penetrate
the domestic markets through foreign direct investments and they have a postive
impact on the total share of formal employment in a country, both in services sector
and manufacturing industry. The mechanisms and interaction between liberaliza-
tion and informality in the literature is mixed though. In the model by Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2003) formal employment is subject to labour market regulations and
costly. Trade liberalization brings more competition, greater competition drives
the demand for cheaper informal inputs therefore the relationship between infor-
mal employment and trade liberalization is unambigously positive. In their model,
the degree of reallocation from the formal to informal sector depends on the degree
of labour market flexibility. Aleman-Castilla (2006) finds that the least productive
firms which are mostly informal will be forced to exit and the trade liberalization
will reduce the informality. Fugazza and Fiess (2010) employ various macro and
micro data sets and suggest that macro-founded data sets support the conventional
view that trade liberalization is associated with an increase with informality while
the micro-founded data set do not.
In this paper I test this hypothesis by using Turkish Labour Force Surveys
between 2008-2012 and the regional macro data for Turkey. Due to the potential
endogeneity problem, I use various instrumental variables for the financial services
development. There are two unique datasets to construct instruments with ex-
ogenous variation. The first one is the religiousity and political survey that was
conducted by Turkish Economic Policy Research Institute (TEPAV) at the end of
2011 and beginning of 2013 which have regional representation power. Turkey is
a predominantly muslim country (98%) however, the degree of religousity varies
accross regions. Islam bans any financial transaction that involves interest and I
conjecture that in the regions where islamic conservatism is higher, the demand for
consumer credits and credit cards should be on average lower. TEPAV’s surveys
include several questions that measure subjects’ degree of religiousity and I aim
to use this exogenous variation as an instrument for financial services indicators
such as consumer credits per capita and expenditure per capita that is done by
using using credit cards. The second unique dataset that was never used in the
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literature is the loss of Ottoman Armenian population between 1914-1917 due to
forced expulsion and extermination by the ruling Ottoman during World War I.
The identifying assumption is that the Armenians were the main users of the fi-
nancial services as they were the main trading class, and when they were deported,
it was a permanent blow to the financial sector. The baseline OLS findings as well
as the 2SLS estimations suggest that the financial sector expansion have an impact
on formal employment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts by motivating the case of
Turkey. In section 3, I describe the data and present some descriptive statistics. I
then present the empirical evidence on the impact of expansion of financial services
on formal employment in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Motivation: The Case of Turkey
In this section, I present macro evidence on the expansion of financial services
sector in Turkey before establishing the link between formalization of employment
and expansion of financial services using micro data. Turkey is an emerging market
economy which has been recording a strong growth performance in the last decade.
After coming out of a catastrophic financial crisis in 2001, the country went through
extensive structural reforms and tightened budgetary policies under the Stand-by
Arrangement Program with the IMF. The economy grew about 43% since year
2000.4 The growth rates in 2010 and 2011 were second highest in the world after
China with 9.2% and 8.5%. The rigorous program implementation, recapitalization
and banking reforms as well as the decrease in uncertainty associated with the
budgetary discipline brought with it significant capital inflows and foreign direct
investments, mostly in the financial intermediation and services sector. Figure 1.1
shows the cumulative FDI flows by sectors between 2005-2011. According to the
statistics provided by the Investment Agency of Turkey, services sector was the
biggest recipient of the FDI inflows between 2005-2011 and within the services
4http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21579005-protests-against-recep-tayyip-erdogan-
and-his-ham-fisted-response-have-shaken-his-rule-and
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sector, financial intermediation attracted the largest share ranging from 27% to
83%. During this period, there have been several bank mergers and acquisitions
as well as the penetration of international giants like HSBC and City Bank into
Turkey. As for the FDI flows into industrial sector, more than half of the inflows
were directed towards electricity, gas and water supply.5
Figure 1.1: Cumulative FDI Flows by Sectors (million US$)
Data by Turkstat shows that the share of labour employed in the financial
intermediation services was unchanged at 1.2% between 2004 and 2011, however
the value added per worker (in 1998 prices) in the same sector increased by 71.3%
while the industrial value added per worker actually declined. A natural outcome of
the expansion of financial intermediation services has been the increase in consumer
credits. Historically the biggest recipient of bank credits have been the small and
medium entreprises (SME) through state controlled banks during the 1990s. As
Figure 1.2 shows, the share of consumer credits in total credits went from literally
zero in 2002 to around 25% as of 2012. On the other hand, the share of industrial
credits which constituted 53.7% of the total credits in 2002 fell down to 27.3% in
just 10 years time.
Although the share of consumer credits has been steadily increasing in the
last decade, cross-country comparisons show that loans to households in Turkey is
among the lowest as compared to peer countries. Figure 1.3 shows that the loans
5http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/investmentguide/investorsguide/Pages/FDIinTurkey.aspx
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Figure 1.2: Share of Sectoral Banking Credits
to households as a percent of GDP stood at 17.6% as of 2011 and Turkey ranked at
the bottom across the OECD countries. However, it is worth noting that the loans
to households were just %12 percent of GDP by the end of 2008, and in just three
years time the growth of household credits surpassed the growth rate of GDP.6
Figure 1.3: Loans to Households (% of GDP, 2011)
In what comes next, I present evidence on the changing modes of consumption
in Turkey. While Turkey managed to attract short term and long term inflows that
6In the section on Data Sources and Description, we provide more detailed information on
per capita credit growth and other indicators of financial services expansion between 2008-2012.
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led to cheaper finance during the last decade, another phenomena taking place hand
in hand with financial services sector was the increase in the number of shopping
malls, supermarkets and other retail chains. There were two new processes in effect
that fueled consumption; the first one is the economies of scale offered by retail
chains conglomorated in shopping malls. Trade Council of Shopping Centers and
Retailers of Turkey (TCSC) provides monthly aggregate data on various indicators
regarding the performance of the retail sector since 2006. Figure 1.4 shows that
between 2006 and 2012, i) the land used by retailers and shopping malls (measured
as square meters), ii) employment and iii) number of shops have increased more
that 2.5 folds. According to the data by TCSC, the total number of shopping
centers in Turkey stood at 367 by the end 2013.7
Figure 1.4: Wholesale and Retail Sector Performance Indicators)
The second process that fueled consumption in Turkey was the increasing access
to credit cards and the opportunity to pay in several installments for expenditures
paid via credit cards (a very common practise offered by banks in Turkey). Ac-
7http://www.ampd.org/arastirmalar/default.aspx?SectionId=164 Unfortunately, the data on
the number of shopping malls and the rentable area is not available on a regional basis.
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cording to a survey published by the Interbank Card Center, 52% of the subjects
in 2011, and 61% in 2012 suggested that their choice of a specific credit card de-
pends on the installment opportunities.8 The same survey shows that 39% of the
subjects prefered that the installment opportunities to be offered in the consumer
durables and 37% prefered them to be in technology goods. Interbank Card Cen-
ter data also shows that the number of debit and credit cards increased from 64
million in 2009 to 91 million as of end 2012 (note that the population of Turkey is
around 73.6 million) while the number of pos machines (which process the in-store
payment by credit cards) increased from 1.4 million to 2.1 million during the same
period.9 Volume of transactions with domestic credit cards went up from 139.1
billion Turkish Liras in 2007 to 355.1 billion TL by the end of 2012. The number
of transactions with domestic credit cards were recorded at 1.4 billion in 2007 and
at 2.4 billion in 2012.10
While the modernization and changing patterns of consumption might have
direct and indirect positive effects on formal employment in each sector, formal-
ization in the wholesale and retail sectors are likely to be highest. The reasoning
is as follows; i) the impact of domestic and international retail chains: retailers
operating in domestic market specializing in many different products ranging from
clothing to technology or grocessy are subject to tighter tax regulations, permis-
sions and audits. Therefore it is only natural that jobs created in these sectors are
much more likely to be formal than informal as opposed to small, family-owned
traditional local stores. ii) visibility channel: not only the retail chains, but also
many other firms, enterprises operating in service sector are likely to be exposed
to positive and negative externalities in this new way of consumption. Food and
catering services are such examples. Retailers as well as restaurants naturally pre-
fer operating where masses of people visit. Increasing visibility helps revenues but
at the same time limits the room for informal modes of doing business such as em-
ploying informally. iii) the outside option channel: competition among enterprises
is likely to increase the need for professionalism and attracting employees with
higher qualifications. Workers with better qualifications, on the other hand are
more likely to ask for formal contracts and under more pleasant work conditions.
8Card Monitor: Credit Card Habit Surveys, 2012
9http://www.bkm.com.tr
10http://www.bkm.com.tr/donemsel-bilgiler.bkm
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An anectodal evidence comes from an NY Times article, which suggests that
in China although the wages are on average more than two times higher, Chinese
graduates say no to factory shops and prefer urban positions and office jobs. A
particular paragraph from the article reads:
“Mr. Wang, 25, has worked only several months at a time in low-paying jobs,
once as a shopping mall guard, another time as a restaurant waiter and most
recently as an office building security guard. But he will not consider applying for
a full-time factory job because Mr. Wang, as a college graduate, thinks that is
beneath him. Instead, he searches every day for an office job, which would initially
pay as little as a third of factory wages.” 11
It is indeed possible to make a similar line of argument between the formal and
informal jobs.
Before moving on to establish the empirical link between the expansion of
financial services and formal employment, I provide a snapshot of the evolution of
the share of the formal and informal employment across non-agricultural sectors
since 2004. Here, we exclude mining and electricity, gas production from total
industrial production as the labour share in those two sub-sectors are both less
than 1% in total. Table 1.1 shows the change in shares of formal employment in
manufacturing and services sectors. We see that the share of formal employment
has increased significantly in both sectors. However, when one considers the fact
that the services sector employs around 43% of the total Turkish labour force
versus 18% share of employment in industry, the difference across the two sector
becomes more stark.
This section presented evidence on the aggregate trends of the financial services
sector and the channels through which it might have had an impact on the Turk-
ish formal employment. Next, I describe the datasets and provide more detailed
information before moving on to establishing an empirical link between the formal
employment and financial services expansion.
11http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/business/as-graduates-rise-in-china-office-jobs-fail-to-
keep-up.html?pagewanted=all& r=0
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Table 1.1: Employment Shares by Formality
Manufact. Manufact. Services Services Wholesale Wholesale
2004 2012 2004 2012 2004 2012
Formal 68.7 79.3 67.8 76.2 55.6 72.1
Informal 32.3 20.7 32.2 23.8 44.4 27.9
Source: Own estimations using Household Labour Surves provided by Turkstat
1.3 Data Sources and Description
The last section presented evidence using the time series macro data. Un-
fortunately, the aggregate country-level time series data on consumer credits and
financial sector growth is limited to present meaningful evidence. The empirical
strategy in this paper relies on the regional variation across 26 regions of Turkey
(at NUTS 2 level) albeit over a somewhat limited time period.
I combine three main datasets for the purpose of the study. The first dataset is
the regional financial indicators series that includes variables such as total spending
by credit cards, consumer credits, total employment in the financial sector, number
of bank branches and cash machines. These statistics are collected and dissemi-
nated by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey (BRSA) and
available between 2008-2012. Unfortunately, the BRSA does not disseminate data
before 2008 on the grounds that due to the centralized decision making in the
banking system, banks reported most of the financial indicators (such as regional
credits) as if they pertained to Istanbul region, when the real recipient of the credit
actually resided elsewhere, simply because the credits were approved by the head-
quarters in Istanbul which is the financial capital of Turkey. Starting from 2008,
reporting procedures were improved to reflect the correct regional financial indi-
cators. Below, I list some descriptive statistics about average consumer credits,
spending by credit cards and number of branches.
1.2 shows the impressive growth in real credits and expenditure by credit cards
between 2008 and 2012. While the real GDP per capita grew about 9.1% from
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Table 1.2: Selected Financial Services Indicators (Unweighted Average of 26 re-
gions)
2008 2012 Change (%)
Credit card expenditure per capita (TL) 3,337*** 10,940*** 227.8%
(1028.2) (1,031.3)
Consumer credits per capita (TL) 929.7*** 2181.4*** 134.6%
(101.8) (196.3)
Number of branches 350*** 422*** 20.6%
(103.3) (122.7)
Real consumer credits per capita (TL)(1) 5.9** 10.4*** 74.7%
(637.7) (932.4)
Real credit card expenditure per capita (TL) 21.3*** 52.5*** 146%
(6.4) (4.9)
Notes
Credit card expenditure per capita ($) 2581.2 6146.5 138.1%
Consumer credits per capita ($) 719.1 1225.5 70.4%
GDP per capita (TL)(2) 13,378 18,846 40.9%
GDP per capita ($) 10,347 10,588 2.3%
(1) Standard deviations in paranthesis
(1) deflated by regional CPI (2004=100)
(2) Official figure for Turkey, not regional average as data is not available
Sources: Own Estimates using BRSA-Finturk, Turkstat and Central Bank Data
2008 to 2012, real consumer credits per capita have increased by 74%.12 Figure 1.5
displays the differences in nominal credit card expenditures per capita across 26
regions of Turkey. As the figure shows, Istanbul, Ankara and south-west coastline of
Turkey fare much better, while the south-east part of Turkey is lagging significantly
behind. This research tries to exploit these regional differences though the time
series dimension is limited to2008-2012 period.
The second dataset is the household labour surveys conducted by Turkstat
between 2008-2012. The surveys are rotating panels, with each household to be
visited 4 times over 18 months period. The number of households visited per
month is approximately 14,000. Unfortunately the panel dimesion of the surveys
are not publicly available, therefore one has to treat each survey as a cross-section.
12GDP per capita growth rates are reported as nationwide
(http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?alt id=55), and not as regional average.
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Figure 1.5: Credit Card Expenditures Accross Regions (in real terms)
The survey includes detailed information about the background of an individual,
education, maritial status, labour force status, past work experience, sector, region
where the individual resides, whether the individual is employed as a registered
worker to the social security system or not, i.e. employed as formal or informal.
Unfortunately there is no information on whether the entreprises where the indi-
viduals are employed are formaly registered in the tax system or not. Therefore,
in measuring formal employment, I use the information on whether the indivual is
registered to the social security system by the employer or not. Merging the an-
nual surveys provide us with over 1 million observations (including the agriculture
sector) between 2008-2012. In all the estimations, however, I exclude the agricul-
tural sector employment since the main focus of the paper is the formalization of
employment in urban areas catalyzed by the automation of transactions. More
information on the household labour force surveys can be found in Data Appendix
and in Table 1.7.
The last data set is the regional indicators data disseminated by Turkstat,
covering 26 regions of Turkey at NUTS 2 level and providing a rich set of social,
economic and infrastructure indicators during the same period. Unfortunately the
data on GDP at the regional level is available only until 2008. However, the dataset
includes other useful indicators that we rely on as proxy variables for regional eco-
nomic activity. Those variables namely are the i) regional electricity consumption
per capita ii) the area (in square meters) of the completed or partially completed
office buildings and iii) completed or partially completed residential buildings (in
square meters). The last two variables are worth elaborating. Construction sec-
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tor in Turkey has been traditionally strong, and these variables can be considered
as proxies for both the general economic activity, (partially reflecting infrastruc-
ture and housing investments) and for hinting expectations on job creation (as the
offices buildings are meant to be filled with workers) at a regional basis. These
statistics are reported by the regional municipalities which are the authorized bod-
ies for construction permits. Note that these variables are reported as an annual
flows, and not as stocks. Below, I display descriptive statistics on the key vari-
ables of interest. In the empirical analysis, I exploit the variation in these proxy
variables as covariates along with key indicators of average education attainment,
age and wage gaps between the formal and informal workers.
Table 1.3: Growth Rates of Selected Indicators (unweighted average of 26 regions)
2008 2012 Change (%)
Formal Hours (% of total) 64.7*** 71.5*** 10.5%
(2.6) (2.1)
Formal Employment (% of total) 65.2*** 71.6*** 9.8%
(2.5) (1.9)
Completed Res. Buildings (million m2) 1.9*** 2.9*** 52.8%
(3.7) (0.083)
Completed Office Buildings (million m2) 0.08*** 0.14*** 75%
(0.02) (0.008)
Total Electricity Cons. (per cap, kw) 2.2*** 2.6*** 16%
(0.2) (0.2)
Unemployment Rate 10.9*** 8.6*** -26.7%
(0.69) (0.68)
In aggregating each regional variable, individual weights provided in LFS are used.
Sources: Own Estimates using Turkstat Data
In addition to these main datasets, I rely on two additional ones when address-
ing the endogeneity of the consumer financial services expansion. The first one is
the ethnicity, religiousity and political tendencies survey and the second one is the
historical regional data on the loss of Armenian population which were the trading
and the artisan class (and therefore likely to be the main users of the financial
services). This second dataset will be explained in detail in a seperate section with
the historical background.
Religiousity and political tendencies surveys were conducted by the Turkish
Economic Policy Research Institute (Tepav) at end-2011 and early 2013 in order
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to help contribute to policy discussions on critical political issues of that time such
as i) public perceptions on minority rights, ii) the rights of minorities to receive
state or private education in mother-language (discussed mostly for the kurdish),
iii) removal of headscarf ban for public employees as well as for girls in secondary
education, and iv) public perceptions about relaxation of the secular law system
towards a more religious one. The 2011 survey was conducted between November
26-December 4 across the regions of Turkey and represents the voter population
over 18 years old with a confidence level of 98.5%. The 2013 survey was conducted
between April 6-7, 2013 and have the same regional representative power. For
consistency and in order to monitor the change in perceptions over time, both
surveys included identical questions.
Using the information in the survey, I use the ‘religiousity’ as an instrument
for the financial services expansion. The survey question that remains in both
surveys and that I use in measuring the degree of religiousity in this paper is the
percent of population who declares themselves to be ‘regulary praying five times a
day’. Praying five times during the day is mandatory in Islam, however only those
individuals who are usually truly pious obey the command. Islam considers that
interest is not ‘halal’, i.e. the business transactions should be conducted free of
interest.13 Islamic banking does not allow for interest bearing savings accounts and
similarly consumer credits as well as credit cards are considered to be as haram as
well by conservative muslims. Therefore, I make the critical identifying assumption
that in those regions where the inhabitants are on average more religious, financial
services growth should be relatively limited as the demand for financial products
like consumer loans or credit cards is likely to be lower. This generates an exoge-
nous variation in financial services expansion that is not directly related to formal
employment. The second critical assumption that I make in my analysis is that
2013 survey is representative of religious habits and attitutes for the year 2012
as i) the survey was conducted in early 2013 (April) and ii) religious beliefs in a
society are not expected to radically change in couple of months. This assumption
provides me with two cross-sections with identical questions for the years 2011 and
13The islamic banking replaces interest with profit and loss sharing which practically serves as
interest payment through commissions, fees, penalties and profit sharing, however, the conven-
tional definition of interest is strictly forbidden. On the other hand, Islamic banking practises in
Turkey is very limited because Turkey is a secular state by constitution.
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2012 which I rely on for two stage estimations in the next section.
1.4 Empirical Relationship
In order to establish the empirical link between financial services sector and
formal employment, I first merge the combined household labour force surveys of
2008-2012 with the regional socio-economic indicators of Turkstat and regional fi-
nancial indicators of the BRSA. This provides us with 437,773 observations each
containing region level socio-economic and financial information. Using the com-
bined dataset, I first run logistic regressions to estimate whether there is any
relationship between the consumer financial services expansion and the probabil-
ity of being employed formally controlling for individual characteristics as well as
regional variables. The equation of interest is the following one:
Yi,j,t = β0 + β1Xj,t + β2Zi,j,t + β3Dt + i,j,t (1.1)
where i denotes the individual, j denotes the region and t denotes the time.
Xj,t is the vector of regional variables of interest, namely i) the consumer financial
services expansion, ii) unemployment rate, iii) electricity consumption per capita,
iv) average firm size (in terms of employment) v) squaremeters of completed res-
idential buildings per capita, vi) squaremeters of completed office buildings per
capita, vii) average years of schooling, viii) real earnings gap between the formal
and informal workers, ix) age gap between the formal and informal workers, and
x) education gap the formal and informal workers. The first six variables aim to
capture the economic activity while the last four variables are aimed to capture the
regional inequality differences and development gaps across regions.14 Zj,t is the
14Average age and education themselves are slow changing variables that exhibit very little
variation over the sample period, 2008-2012 within regions. Yet in less developed regions with
inferior socio-economic conditions, there is a possibility that average age and education levels
could differ significanty across formal and informal groups due to different fertility rates and
social inquality. Therefore, these -gap measures- (measured as the ratio of formal to informal)
are aimed to capture these fundamental differences across regions.
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vector of individual characteristics such as the civil status, experience, age, sex,
educational status, sector employed, size of the firm the individual is employed at,
whether the individual is employed permanently or termporarily and whether the
individual lives in urban areas or not.
It is worth mentioning that in year 2008, the government reduced the rates
of social security contributions by employers to limit the impact of the global
financial crisis. However, the change in legislation targeted female workers of all
ages and male workers only between ages 18-29 and the law enforced uniform cuts
of contributions across all 26 regions without favoring any particular region.15 I
acknowledge that the fact that the regional consumer credit data is available only
starting from 2008 is a weakness, such that we have no data prior to 2008 to control
for the full impact of the legislation change. Therefore there is a possibility that the
analysis mistakenly attributes the impact of legislation change to the increase in
financial services. However, there are three reasons why this might not be a severe
problem. First, new social security contributions were uniform accross Turkey and
the estimations include full time dummies (and in the next section where I test the
relationship at the regional level, all estimations are fixed effects). Therefore, the
impact of the legislation should be controlled for. Second, the legislation targeted
mainly female workers. According to Turkstat, female labour force participation
rate in Turkey was as low as 24% in 2008, 42% of the female employers were
employed in agricultural sector, and only 28% of the informal female workers were
employed outside agricultural sector. By the end of 2012, the participation rate
went up to 29% while 42% was still employed in agricultural sector.16 Therefore
the impact of the legislation change is unclear at least in terms of structure of
female employment. It is very likely that the slow increase in female participation
and employment is due to the natural demographic trajectory with cohorts with
higher schooling rates entering the labour force. And third, as for male workers,
legislation change for only the 18-29 age group is somewhat limited and the analysis
already controls for average age differentials between formal and informal workers.
In what follows, I measure consumer services expansion using two alternative
variables, namely the real consumer credits per capita and population per bank
15http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5763.html
16http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt id=1007
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branch (both in natural logs) where the key assumption is that the regional con-
sumer credits per capita and population per bank branch are exogenous from the
individual’s point of view.17 The results are summarized in Tables 1.8 and 1.9
and includes the pooled estimations for the combined surveys of 2008-2012 as well
estimations using cross-sections of each year seperately. The pooled estimations
show that a 1% increase in the real consumer credits per capita is associated
with a 3.2% increase in being employed formally. Accordingly, a 1% increase in
the population per bank branch (meaning more individuals have to share a bank
branch) is associated with a 3.7% decline in the probability of being employed for-
mally. The pooled data allows to control for changes in aggregate conditions in the
economy over the years, however, estimations of each cross section yields similar
coefficients; in the range of 2.3% to 4.8% for the real consumer credits and -2.2%
to -5.7% for the population per bank branch. As expected, unemployment has a
negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of being employed
formally, with estimates in the range of -0.1% to -0.5% for in both specifications.
Negative and significant coefficients on the age and education gaps between the
formal and informal workers suggest that in those regions where the formally em-
ployed are on average older and more educated, the probability of being employed
formally is lower. On the other hand, the regional variables that are used as proxy
for economic activity turns out not to be statistically significant, while electricity
consumption per capita has the opposite sign for both specifications in Tables 1.8
and 1.9.18 The coefficients on all individual characteristics are as expected, being a
female employee decreases the likelihood of being employed formally, whereas being
married is positively associated with probability of working formally. Education
dummy coefficients are positive and highly significant, while working temporarily
increases the chances of being employed informally.
One of the hypothesis of this paper is that the impact on formal employment
should be strongest in the wholesale and retail sector, if there is any. Therefore
17Although the combined sample size is large, I acknowledge that the results might be subject
to omitted variables bias due to unobservable characteristics based on households, as one cannot
exploit the rotating panel dimension due to the fact that unique identifiers are not provided by
Turkstat. Nevertheless, I am still interested in revealing the empirical correlation based on the
data available.
18Although the coefficients are small, the negative sign could be reflecting the informality in
the densely populated industrial regions.
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in order to explore the sectoral differences, I estimate the probability of formal
employment for 6 sectors, namely; the i) manufacturing, ii) construction, iii) retail
food and accomodation, iv) transportation and communication, v) financial ser-
vices and administrative support and finally vi) social and personal services. 19 In
the sectoral estimations, I use the real consumer credits per capita as the measure
of financial services expansion, however, the results are completely robust to using
the population per branch or real credit card expenditures.20 In line with the pri-
ors, sectoral estimations in Table 1.10 show that the coefficient of real consumer
credits is highest in the retail, food and accomodation sector, a 1% increase in real
consumer credits per capita increases the probability of being employed formally
about 12.1%. The association is sizeable and statistically highly significant. Tak-
ing into account the fact that services, especially the sub-sector, retail, food and
accomodation employs the largest share of total employment in Turkey (on average
27.1%, followed by 25.1% in manufacturing), the results are encouraging such that
there is a natural path for formalization as financial services sector develops. The
relationship is also still significant, albeit weakly for other sectors as well except
for the financial services sector. This is expected given the fact that banking and
insurance sectors constitute the largest fraction of financial services sector where
formality is very high to start with.
Although the region level variables should be fairly exogenous from the indi-
viduals’ point of view, the endogenous nature of the financial services expansion is
a concern in establishing a empirical relationship with formality. In what follows
next, I instrument the two measures of financial services in a two stage probit es-
timation. The instruments that I use are; i) percent of the married population in
total regional population for the pooled estimations for 2008-2012, ii) religousity
as measured by the percent of regional population who regulary prays five times a
day for 2011-2012. The first instrument is aimed to capture the fact that married
couples are more likely receive consumer loans or do spending with credit cards,
therefore the expected sign in the first stage is positive. The identifying assumption
19Turkstat’s Household Labour Survey for 2008 reports sectors employed (Nace Rev 1) only in
1 digit under 8 broad categories under agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity and gas,
construction’ retail food and accomodation, transportation and communication. The breakdown
starting from 2009 is provided in 2 digits and the conversion tables provided by the Turkstat is
used to aggregate the data for consistency with the 2008 dataset.
20The estimations are available upon request.
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is that the percent of the population that is married directly affects the demand for
financial services whereas it has no direct impact on formal employment. This is
admittedly a strong assumption to make as the logit estimations in Tables 1.8 and
1.9 show that being married increases the probability of being employed formally.
Under the assumption that the regional percent of the married population is fairly
exogenous from individual’s point of view, I present the results in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 1.11. On the other hand, given the questionable nature of this instru-
ment, I use the religiosity as an alternative to the percent of married population
where the estimations are presented in columns (3) and (4). Unfortunately since
the measure on religiousity at the regional level is avaliable only for 2011-2012, the
number of observations fall by half.
Two-stage probit estimations in Table 1.11 show that the coefficients for both
the real consumer credits and population per bank branch have the expected sign
and are statistically highly significant, albeit the slightly higher than the previous
estimations. The estimations show that 1% increase in real consumer credits per
capita increases the probability of being employed formally about 4.2% to 4.7%.
Accordingly, 1% increase in population per bank branch reduces the probability
of being employed formally about 4.7% to 5.6%. Table 1.11 summarizes the first
stage results. In all four scpecifications, first stage coefficients of the instruments
have the expected sign and they are statistically higly significant. Percent of the
married population is positively correlated with real consumer credits per capita
and negatively correlated with population per bank branch. Similarly, we see that
in those regions where the population is more religious, real credits per capita is
lower and the population per bank branch is higher. On the other hand, the Wald
Test suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation (rho)
between the errors in the probit equation and the reduced-form equation for the
endogenous regressor is zero. Both the plain logit estimations and the two-stage
probit estimations confirm that financial services expansion as measured by real
consumer credits per capita and population per bank branch has a statistically
significant effect on the probability of being employed formally. Over all, the
estimated effect is in the range of 2.2% to 4.7% for the consumer credits and -2.3%
to -5.6% for population per bank branch.
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Region Level Fixed Effects Estimations
After the micro estimations, I next investigate the empirical relationship at
the regional macro level. In what follows, I first run fixed effect regressions of
formally worked hours on the same regional variables as above.21. As in the case
of micro data, I again use the real consumer credits per capita and population
per bank branch as the measures of financial services expansion, but also include
real credit card expenditures per capita as an additional measure. This measure
is slightly less likely to be subject to the endogeneity problem as compared to the
consumer credits due to the fact that banks in Turkey are much more lenient on
providing credit cards to customers irrespective of income-age-education or formal
employment statuses whereas requirements for loans are stricter. Since banks are
more likely to extend credits to those who have documented incomes and job
security, consumer credits are more likely to be higher in regions where formality
rate is higher, which makes the endogeneity problem more severe. After running
OLS with fixed effects, I run 2SLS estimations using the same instruments as
before and then in the next section, I exploit an alternative instrument, namely
the Armenian population loss.
The first set of OLS with fixed effects estimations at regional level are listed
in Table 1.14. Neither real consumer credits per capita, nor real credit card ex-
penditures per capita turn out to be statistically significant at the regional level,
while population per bank branch is significant only at 10% significance level. This
measure of consumer financial services has the expected sign, and suggests that 1%
increase in population per bank branch is associated with 0.142 percentage points
decline in formally worked hours. On the other hand, formality does not seem
to be associated with the variables to reflect macroeconomic conditions such as
the unemployment rate, electricity consumption per capita or office building con-
struction, except for residential building construction. As expected, variables that
reflect development levels such as the average years of schooling and the education
gap between the formal and informal workers are statistically highly significant.
Average years of schooling is the most important determinant of formality rate
whilst the real wage gap between formal and informal workers is insignificant. The
21The results are almost identical when I use formal employment rate instead of formal hours
worked
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age gap variable between formal and informal workers is also significant and the
sign is positive, indicating that the regions in which formal workers are relatively
older, formality rate is more likely to be higher.
Next, in order to control for the potential endogeneity problem with respect
to these three measures of financial services expansion, I estimate two stage least
squares using the same instruments, i) proportion of the married population and
ii) religiousity. As explained before, the exogeneity of the first instrument might
be of concern and while the religiosity is a better instrument for that matter, the
availability of this variable for only two years (and hence the sample size of just 52)
is also problematic. Nevertheless, the estimation resuls and the first stage statistics
are summarized in Tables 1.14 and 1.15. Results show that the coefficients of the
measures of financial services are statistically significant and have the expected
sign. The coefficients of the instruments also have the expected sign and are
highly significant in all the cases. The percent of married population is positively
correlated with both the real consumer credits and credit card expenditures per
capita and negatively correlated with population per branch. Religiousity likewise,
is negatively correlated with credits and credit card expenditures and positively
correlated with population per bank branch. On the other hand, first stage F
statistics with respect to religiousity instrument are unfortunately mostly below
the rule of thumb level of 10. All the three endogenous variables pass the Wu-
Hausman test of exogeneity for which the null hypothesis is that the specified
endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. This suggests that
the plain fixed effects Table 1.14 might be better estimates taking into also account
the possibility of large biases.
Overall, the region level evidence is less conclusive as compared to the micro
estimates. Although the results show that financial services expansion seems to
increase the probability of being employed formally, we cannot safely conclude that
at the macro level overall formality is improved. Due to the short time dimension
of the panel and limited number of truly exogenous instruments available, one
needs to take the estimation results with caution.
In what comes next, I explore an alternative dataset which is the Armenian
regional population loss between 1914-1917. The main assumption that I build the
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empirical analysis on, is that the Armenians were the main users of the financial
system, since they were the trading and artisan classes as opposed to the Muslims
who were allocated fertile land by the Ottoman Empire and were mostly employed
in agricultural sectors. Adopting the view that the institutions are very slow
to change, I instrument financial services sector development with the Armenian
population loss. In the next section, I first summarize the historical events and
re-run the estimations using the population loss data as an instrument.
1.5 Exploiting A Historical Data: Armenian Pop-
ulation Loss
The empirical relationship I try to establish in this section is based on the his-
torical events that took place in Anatolia under the Ottoman rule in the beginning
of the 20th century. During 1914-1917 nearly a million Armenian citizens living in
Anatolia under the Ottoman Empire were expelled and massacred. As will be ex-
plained in more detail below, the Armenians were the artisans and the trading class
and had higher schooling rates than the Muslim subjects of the Empire. Moreover,
the deportation decision were not executed uniformly across the country, excluding
the main cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, targeting ethnic cleansing mainly in
the Eastern provinces with the pretext that the Armenians cooperated with the
Russian Empire which had ambitions to expand towards Eastern Anatolia. The
crucial identifying assumption in this paper is that the Armenians were among the
main class that used financial instruments and when and where they were almost
completely exterminated, the financial know-how was lost with a permanent effect
on the financial development.
The regional data used in this paper is from Talaat Pasha’s own private report
on the ‘Armenian Genocide’. His private report which provided a detailed break-
down of Ottoman Armenians in each province in 1914 and 1917 was published in
2008 by historian Murat Bardakci. Talaat Pasha’s writings were submitted along
with other documents to Bardakci by Talaat Pasha’s wife, Hayriye Talat in 1983,
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shorthly before her death but did not include the deportation report initially. In
preparation for an essay for the 90th anniversary of the tragic events, Bardakci
called the living relatives of Hayriye Talaat in 2005 to ask whether other writings
were left by Talaat Pasha and only then this report which was meticulously hidden
in an old luggage was uncovered.22
Talaat Pasha was one of the three key Ottoman officials of the time and was
the Interior Minister when the laws of deportation and confiscation of the Arme-
nian property were executed. This data is an evidence of the ‘official account of
deportations’. The last modern Ottoman census was carried over between 1906-
1907, however population count and ethno-statistics were rigorously collected for
Ottoman rulers due to the facts that i) the Empire was in military conflict in var-
ious fronts and they were needed for security and military reasons, and ii) there
was a huge inlux of muslim refrugees escaping from Balkans and Caucasians and
the Empire needed to secure the living conditions of the new comers. The most
detailed statistical count was carried over for Armenian population due to the rea-
sons that will be explained below. From Talaat Pasha’s report, we see that there
was a secret count of the Armenian population in 1915 which included recent data
on births, death and migration which were added on top of the 1906-07 census
and provided a calculation of the ethnic composition by 1914 (Dundar, 2008: page
143). From Talat Pasha’s notes it is also understood that after executing the ‘Tem-
porary Deportation Law of Armenians’ in 1915, Talaat Pasha asked for detailed
progress reports from 34 provinces (23 vilayets plus mutasarrifliks, the smaller ad-
ministrative units) in 24 August 1916 to see how many Armenians there were in
each province, how many were ‘native’ and how many of them were ‘outsiders’.
And six months later on 11 February 1917, he sent another set of telegrams to 23
provinces asking for headcounts of native and outsider Armenians (Sarafian, 2011:
pages 5-11).
The evidence in this section is based on this dataset that was made publicly
available by Murat Bardakci and summarized later by another historian, Ara
Sarafian in 2011. Table 1.4 shows the Armenian population in 1914 and 1917
before and after the deportation decision was executed and the figures show that
22Murat Bardakci, (2008) ‘Talat Pasa’nin Evrak-i Metrukesi’. pages 28-29
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more than a million Armenian citizens of the Ottoman Empire were missing; either
deported, massacred or perished along the way.
Table 1.4: Armenian Population Loss, 1914-1917
Native Armenians, Outside Armenians, Armenians of Province Armenians in Missing Armenian
1917 1917 in Other Provinces 1917 1914 Population
Ankara 12,766 410 4,513 44,661 61.31%
Nigde 193 850 555 4,939 84.86%
Izmit 3,880 142 9,464 56,115 76.22%
Kutahya 3,932 680 0 4,023 2.26%
Eskisehir 1,258 1,096 1,228 8,620 71.16%
Bolu 1,539 551 67 3,002 46.50%
Afyon 2,234 1,778 1,504 7,498 50.15%
Icel 252 116 17 350 23.14%
Balikesir 1,852 124 1,696 8,663 59.04%
Kayseri 6,650 111 6,979 47,974 71.59%
Adana 12,263 4,257 19,666 51,723 38.27%
Kahramanmaras 6,115 198 2,110 27,306 69.88%
Sivas 8,097 948 3,974 141,000 91.44%
Kastamonu 3,437 185 232 9,052 59.47%
Konya 3,730 14,210 3,642 13,078 43.63%
Aydin 11,901 5,729 122 19,710 39.00%
Bursa 2,821 178 10,251 59,038 77.86%
Sanliurfa 1,144 6,687 451 15,616 89.79%
Erzurum 0 0 3,364 125,657 97.32%
Bitlis 0 0 1,061 114,704 99.08%
Van 0 0 247 67,792 99.64%
Diyarbakr 0 0 1,849 56,166 96.71%
Trabzon 0 0 580 37,549 98.46%
Elazig 0 0 2,203 70,060 96.86%
Sources: Murat Bardakci, (2008) and Ara Sarafian (2011)
Background
Ottoman Empire was ethnically heterogeneous, consisting of multiple nation-
alities and faiths including Armenians, Greeks, Jewish, and all others that can be
broadly categorized as Muslims. While the Empire was the most powerful state in
the Mediterranean and Europe during the 16th and 17th century, it went through
two interrelated processes in the 19th century: modernization but slow decline.
European states surpassed the Ottoman Empire economically and politically due
to innovation while western ideas of nationalism were imported to the Ottoman
Empire during the same period that had an impact both within the Empire and
beyond its borders (Ungor, 2011: page 25). In 1829 Greece declared indepen-
dence which was followed by Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Wallachia and Moldova
in 1875. Ottoman Empire responded to increasing discontent and nationalism
by passing several reforms ranging from agricultural, industrial, financial, archi-
tectural and land as well as political. Under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II,
Ottoman Empire moved from an absolute monarchy into constitutional monarchy
between 1876-1909. 1876 constitution introduced equal rights to the Christian
minorities and caused enthusiasm also among Armenian communities. However,
as suggested by Ungor (2011: page 26), although transportation, communication,
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education and health care were significantly improved, the reforms did not produce
long-lasting results and nationalism continued unabated. In the meanwhile a new
political group named Young Turks alligning with the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP) emerged whose ideology was based on ‘Muslim nationalism’.
During centuries, Armenians who were the natives of Anatolia since the ancient
times found the way to protect their identities under the Ottoman rule through
education and awareness, especially thanks to the efforts of the Armenian Church.
As explained by Kevorkian and Paboudjian (1992: pages 77-86), Armenian com-
munities went through a period of modernization and renaissance starting from
the 17th century after the establishment of a press in Ishafan by the Armenian
clerics. Printing was prohibitted under the Ottoman rule and the access to books
and publications helped intellectual ideas flourish within the Armenian commu-
nity. The wave continued in the 18th and 19th centuries when printing was finally
allowed. Publishers based in Constantinople (Istanbul) started to grow in numbers
and several liberal Armenian schools were openned. The Armenian intelligentsia
became increasingly vocal about the need that the schooling rates (especially in
the Eastern regions) had to be increased in order to maintain the Armenian iden-
tity. The constitution of 1863 which brought autonomy to decision making also
helped increase the number of Armenian schools. This positive phase however, was
interrupted as Sultan Abdulhamid turned increasingly authoritarian and the con-
stitution was suspended. In the meanwhile, the life of Armenians in the Eastern
provinces were getting tougher, on one hand facing attacks from Kurdish rebel-
lions that were provoked intentionally by the Sultan against Armenians and on
the other hand receiving arms and support from Russians who had ambitions to
control the Caucasians and Anatolia. The political suppression and provocations
finally led two major massacres of the Armenians, first in 1896 and then in 1909
which ended up with a death toll of hundred thousands Armenians. These events
were unfortunately the preview of one of the biggest human catastrophe of the
century.
As explained by Ungor (2011: pages 27-33) becoming increasingly discontent
with Sultan Abdulhamid’s repression regime, the Comitte of Union and Progress
branched out into secret cells all over the empire, publishing articles and books to
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disseminate their ideas and eventually overthrow the Sultan. CUP made alliance
with other opposition groups including initially the Armenians and their efforts
carried the Young Turks to power after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, in-
troducing an unprecedented period of freedoms, only to last until the counter-coup
by Sultan’s supporters in April 1909. Unfortunately over time the Young Turks
turned as repressive as the Sultan himself in trying to achieve their nationalistic
aspirations. As Ungor (2011) puts it, ‘like many other revolutions, the Young Turk
revolution betrayed its initial aspirations and Turkish nationalist hegemony led to
dictatorship, war and genocide’. Over the years the political tone of the Young
Turks shifted from Ottoman to Muslim and then to Turkish nationalism (Ungor,
2011: page 29). The Tsarist Russian threat which had imperial ambitions in the
Eastern provinces feeded the Young Turks’ paranoia about Armenian and Kurdish
seperation and the lack of ‘Turkishness’ in the east started becoming a major con-
cern (Ungor, 2011: pages 40-41). The first traumatic development that aggrevated
the nationalist ideas was the Balkan War of 1912, which resulted in the permanent
loss of the entire Balkan peninsula and the massive influx of the Muslim refugees
escaping from slaughters. According to Akcam (2006), Balkan refugees as well as
Circassian and Chechen refugees that escaped from Russians between 1878-1904
inevitably desired for revenge due to the massacres they suffered from and there-
fore played a pivotal role in the killings of the Armenians and the confiscation of
their properties during the genocide in 1915.
In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the World World I, siding with Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and fought against the British Empire, French Repub-
lic, Russian Empire and Italy. By December 1914, Ottoman, under the command
of War Minister Enver Pasa lost the Battle of Sarikamish (North-East Anatolia) to
Russia and Enver Pasa publicly blamed the Armenians for the defeat.23 Armenians
were now considered to be a major threat more than ever and the trust between
the Armenian subjects that were constanty accused for treason and the Ottoman
rulers irreversably shatterred. The critical landmarks for mass massacres were
the deportation and exile decision that targeted major Armenian intellectuals on
April 24, 1915. Today, this date is commemorated as the anniversary of Armenian
23Balakian (2003), The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response.
New York: HarperCollins. pp. 25, 445
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Genocide, although the loss of civilian Armenian population took place after the
‘Temporary Law of Deportation’ and ‘Temporary Law of Expropriation and Con-
fiscation’ on 27 May 1915 and 13 September 1915. The first law aimed at deporting
the Armenians ‘that have engaged in dangerous activities, such as collaborating
with the enemy, massacring the innocent people and instigating rebellions’. The
law was masked as a security measure but authorized deportation, and massacre
of more than a million Armenians including innocent children, women and elderly.
The destination for the deported Armenians was the town of Der Zor in South-East
Syria and the surrounding desert. The security and facilities during deportation
were completely inadequate given the fact that Ottoman was fighting in multiple
fronts during the war. As a result, hundreds of thousands perished from starva-
tion, sickness, robbery, rape and brutal treatment along the way. According to the
estimates, the number of missing Armenian population between 1914-1917 under
Ottoman Empire is about 1.15 million, which roughly corresponds to 77% of 1914
population (Sarafian, 2011: page 6).
The Law of Expropriation and Confiscation aimed at determining the value
of the immovables and land under the pretext of ‘protecting the properties of the
deported Armenians and to be returned to the owners when security was restored’.
All property, including land, livestock, and homes belonging to Armenians, was
to be confiscated by the authorities. However, Armenians never got back. The
properties were mostly allocated to the migrants that fled from the Balkans and
Caucasuses and all other properties including olive, mulberry orchards, vineyards,
workshops, factories and stores were sold at auctions (Ungor and Polatel, 2011:
page 44). According to Talaat Pasha’s report, in 1915, 20,545 buildings, 267,536
acres of land, 76,942 acres of vineyard, 7,812 acres of gardens, 703,491 acres of
olive groves, 4,573 acres of mulberry gardens, 97 acres of orange fields, 5 carts,
4,390 animals, 2,912 agricultural implements, and 524,788 planting seeds were
allocated to the muslim settlers (Ungor and Polatel, 2011: page 82).24 Although
the Young Turks achieved their aspirations of Turkifying Anatolia and providing
means of living to the Muslim refugees, it is not clear whether the human capital
that was lost with Armenians were entirely compensated with new comers. This
24This was also great opportunity for windfall for many Ottoman elites and locals who sized
many valuable Armenian property. Ungor and Polatel (2011) provide an account of many Ot-
toman governors and officials plundering Armenian property in several provinces of Anatolia.
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is an important research topic that needs to be explored eventually by economists
and historians, especially when we are about to enter the 100th anniversary of the
genocide in 2015.
As of today the human crimes against the Armenians are still not officially
recognized by the Turkish Republic, and official narrative is based on ‘World War
I conditions and security requirements’.
Relevance for the Financial Development Gaps in Modern Turkey
As suggested at the beginning of this section, the identifying assumption that
I make in the empirical analysis is that the Armenians were the trading class
of the Ottoman Empire and when the population was exterminated, trade and
financial system was massively hurt. Although it should be possible to document
by detail the number of perished Armenians artizans and traders due to the detailed
etho-statistics carried over by the Ottoman officials of the time, the access to
the Ottoman Archives as well as Land Registry and Cadastre statistics are still
restricted to this date. Therefore, in my analysis, I mostly rely on qualitative side
evidence provided by historians.
Ungor and Polatel (2011; page 18) document that Armenians dominated com-
merce in the east while it was heavily Greek in the west. The authors summarizes
the available commerical statistics as; ‘In 1884, of the 110 merchants in the north-
eastern provincial capital Trabzon, for domestic and international trade a vital
port city, 40 were Armenian and 42, Pontic Greek. According to a 1913 study on
Anatolia by the Armenian parliamentarian and writer Krikor Zohrab, of the 166
importers, 141 were Armenians and 13 were Turks. Of the 9,800 shopowners and
craftsmen, 6,800 were Armenians and 2,550 were Turks; of the 150 exporters, 127
were Armenians and 23, Turks; of the 153 industrialists, 130 were Armenians and
20 were Turks and finally, of the 37 bankers, 32 were Armenians. In the six east-
ern provinces, 32 Armenian money lenders plied their trade versus only 5 Turkish
ones. On the eve of the genocide, in early 1915, of the 264 Ottoman industrial
establishments, only 42 belonged to Muslims, and 172 to non-Muslims. These fig-
ures, based mainly on Ottoman sources, suggest unmistakebly that the economic
intelligentsia of the Ottoman Empire became more and more ’Armenianized’ in
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that period.’
Again, as documented by Ungor and Polatel, (2011: pages 92-95), foreign diplo-
mats were reporting alarms on not only the human crimes but also on the likely
economic disaster that expected the Empire. In june 1915, German Vice Consul
Kuckhoff reported ‘Through the extermination of the Armenian element, all trade
and commerce in Anatolia will be destroyed and any economic development of
the country will be impossible for years to come, for all merchants, industrialist
and craftsmen are almost exclusively Armenians.’ 25. Joseph Pomiankowski, the
Austro-Hungarian Military Atachee of the time reported that the loss of artisans,
merchants, traders and farmers was a major blow to the economy.26 As Ungor and
Polatel (2011, page 94) documented, another German report from Aleppo in 1916
suggested that ‘since 90% of trade in the interior is in the hands of Armenians, the
result is that the country is facing ruin...With the few exceptions, the evacuated
areas there will not be left a single mason, blacksmith, tailor, carpenter, potter,
tentmaker, weaver, shoemaker, jeweler, pharmacist, doctor, lawyer or any other
professional or trader, the country will acually be in a helpless state. 27
Empirical Evidence
In this section, I present the findings on financial development and formalization
of employment using the Armenian population loss as an instrument with the
identifying assumption that Armenians were the trading class and when they were
exterminated, financial knowledge was hit unevenly accross different regions of
Turkey.
The previous section used data on nuts2 regional classification that divided
regions into 26. The Ottoman provinces system was however based on a different
classification though it broadly matched with the current classification. In my
analysis, I exclude the then Ottoman provinces of Beirut, Aleppo, Der Zor, Mosul
25German Foreign Office Archives, R14086, Ab.22101, attachment, report by vice-consul Kuck-
hoff, 4 July 1915, in Ungor and Polatel (2011)
26Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches, 1928 in Ungor and Polatel
(2011)
27German Foreign Office Archives, R14093, Valentini to Bethmann-Hollweg, 10 September
1916, in Ungor and Polatel (2011)
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and Syria as they no longer belong to the Turkish Republic. The remaining Ot-
toman provinces are easily mapped with Turkey’s current provinces and reduced to
18 in my analysis to ensure consistency. Whenever an Ottoman region is included
as a bigger region under current Turkish regional classification, I use the weighted
average for the Armenian population loss, using the 1914 and 1917 data on pop-
ulation. Additionally, I take the yearly averages of remaining data for 2008-2012
and make it a cross-section since the population loss instrument is an exogenous
historical cross-section.
Table 1.5 below summarizes the findings and Table 1.6 summarizes the first
stage results. The result using the Armenian population loss also confirm the earlier
findings that the consumer financial services sector development is associated with
higher fraction of formal employment. The signs are highly statistically significant,
suggesting that as the real consumer credits and real expenditures via credit cards
per capita increases by 1%, share of formal employment goes up about 0.046 to
0.059 percentage points while a 1% in the population per bank branch reduces
the share of formal employment by 0.055 percentage points. These coefficients
are about the same size as the coefficients that were estimated using the married
population ratio and the religiousity measure.
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Table 1.5: Two Stage Least Squares Estimations Using Armenian Population Loss
as Instrument
Instrumented:
1) Real Credit Per Capita
2) Real Credit Card Expenditures Per Capita
3) Population Per Branch
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Real Credits (per capita, in logs) 5.912***
(1.825)
Real Credit Card Expenditures (per capita, in logs) 4.601***
(1.752)
Population Per Bank Branch (per capita, in logs) -5.496***
(1.845)
Unemployment (%) -1.315*** -1.279*** -1.136***
(0.313) (0.356) (0.292)
Electricity consumption (kw, per cap.) -0.667 -0.211 -0.388
(0.789) (0.767) (0.728)
Average Number of Employees at Work 11.402*** 10.352*** 11.725***
(2.746) (2.831) (2.973)
Compl. Res. Buildings (m2, per cap.) -5.674** -4.919* -5.566**
(2.414) (2.566) (2.299)
Real Wage Gap -0.016 -0.295 -0.234
(1.202) (1.220) (1.166)
Average Schooling 9.701* 14.569*** 12.433**
(5.611) (5.047) (5.199)
Education Gap -38.725*** -31.327*** -40.718***
(9.502) (10.101) (9.698)
Age Gap 7.372 0.282 8.008
(19.516) (21.821) (18.548)
Constant 109.902*** 76.596*** 121.066***
(33.710) (29.089) (35.930)
Observations 18 18 18
R-squared 0.962 0.956 0.961
Robust and clustered (at region level) errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
On the other hand, the first stage results are not as strong as the earlier two
stage least square estimations where religiosity and ratio of the married popula-
tion were used as instruments. In all the three cases, the F statistics are lower
than the rule of thumb level of 10. The coefficients of the Armenian population
loss instrument are statistically significant at 5% and 10% levels. However, first
stage results suggest that the bias might be high as the F statistic is way below
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the Stock-Yogo Critical Values for 10% IV relative bias. While the question of
exogeneity for empirical purposes is much less of a concern for this instrument,
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that specified endogenous regressors can be
treated as exogenous using the Wu-Hausman Test of Endogenous Regressors. The
main drawbacks of using the Armenian population loss, however, is that since the
instrument does not vary over time, the dataset is reduced to a cross-section of
2008-2012 averages with small number of observations. Therefore the instrument
acts more or less like region dummies.
Table 1.6: First Stage Statistics: 2SLS Estimations Using Armenian Population
Loss as Instrument
Instrumented:
1) Real Credit Per Capita
2) Real Credit Card Expenditures Per Capita
3) Population Per Branch
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficients of the Instrument
Armenian Population Loss 0.623*** 0.801** -0.670**
(0.204) (0.342) (0.245)
First Stage Statistics
F test of Excluded Instruments 9.27 5.47 7.42
Wu-Hausman Test of Endogeneity(1) 2.272 2.291 2.062
pval (0.132) pval (0.130) pval (0.151)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk / Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat. 9.27 5.47 7.42
(Stock-Yogo Crit. Val. for 10% IV Rel. Bias) 16.38 16.38 16.38
(1) Null Hypothesis: specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Overall, however, despite the drawbacks the estimation results confirm the
earlier findings that consumer services sector development is associated with a
reduction in informal employment share.
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1.6 Conclusion
Informal employment is an important labour market problem in most develop-
ing countries. It has implications on both limiting collection of public tax revenues
and on creating a wedge in labour markets. This paper is not concerned with the
reasons of informality but with the natural reduction of the share of informality in
a small open economy which goes through a fast phase of globalization and finan-
cial integration. Integration has the benefits of i) increasing the supply of credits
in the domestic economy and ii)creating economies of scale with more productive
firms dominating sales. More specifically, liberalization and integration draws in
both international firms for domestic production as well as cheaper credits that
are passed on the consumers which previously face borrowing constraints. As a
result of this phase, modes of consumption and payments are typically modernized
and old consumption habits die in developing countries. This paper argues that
this process should naturally lead to a decline in the share of informality due to
the fact that i) international or bigger firms which have competition advantages
are less likely to employ informally, and ii) consumers whose borrowing constraints
are now relaxed are more likely to become users of new financial products such
as credit cards and consumer credits which were unavailable under autarky. More
specifically, we argue that the second channel, i.e. the consumer credit channel
amplifies the reduction in informal employment.
This paper argues that consumer credit channel helped reduce the informality
in Turkey over the last years. During the last decade, Turkey attracted significant
foreign direct investment inflows, especially into services sectors. Share of consumer
credits went literally from less than 1% to 25% between 2002-2012. Moreover, real
credits per capita increased by 75% between 2008-2012. In this paper, I test these
hypotheses using the household labour surveys merged with regional indicators
and financial databases. I measure consumer financial services growth by three
different variables, namely i) real credits per capita, ii) real expenditures via credit
cards per capita, and iii) population per bank branch.
Starting with logit estimations, I find that one percent increase in the real
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credits is statistically significantly associated with about 3-5% percent increase
in the probability of being employed formally. A percent increase in regional
population per bank branch is statistically significantly associated with about 3-
5% decrease in the probability of being employed formally. Looking at employment
probabilities in selected sectors, I find that the relationship between the financial
services expansion (as measured by the real credits per capita) and the formal
employment probability is strongest in the retail, food and accomodation sector,
confirming the hypothesis of the paper.
Taking into account the potential endogeneity of the financial services expan-
sion, I rely on two stage least squares estimations to establish the empirical link
between formality and financial services enlargement. The two alternative instru-
ments used in the paper are i) the percent of the married population and ii) reli-
giosity as measured by the proportion of the population who prays five times a day.
The identifying assumptions accordingly are as follows; i) married couples are more
likely to be the beneficiaries of consumer credits as well as users of credit cards, ii)
Islam bans any transaction involving interest, therefore the real devoted muslims
are less likely to borrow consumer credits, or use credit cards for that matter.
Using these instruments, I confirm the earlier results for employment probability.
As for the regional estimations of the share of formal employment, using the same
instruments in two stage least squares estimations show a positive and statistically
significant relationship between consumer financial services expansion and formal
employment albeit with somewhat weaker first stage statistics.
And finally, I employ a unique and completely exogenous dataset, which is the
regional Armenian population loss data between 1914-1917 under the hypothesis
that i) Armenian population loss was a blow to financial sector development as
they were the main users of financial instruments, ii) institutions are very slow
to change and the population loss had permanent effects. Using the population
loss as an instrument for financial development, I find similar results, however due
to the time-invariant nature of the instrument as well as the limited number of
observations, this instrument performs relatively poorly.
The results are encouraging, such that from a policy making perspective, coun-
tries should probably encourage financial deepening, electronization of payments
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systems and use of financial products for payments in combatting with informality
rather than other policy tools such as subsidies or investing a lot of resources on
auditing and inspection.
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Data Appendix:
• Consumer Credits: provided quarterly by the Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA) at province level. Annual figures are then aggregated at the Nuts2
level for 26 regions. Real consumer credits per capita are consumer credits deflated
by regional CPI indices and divided by the regional population. Regional CPI
indices are provided by the Turkish Central Bank and population figures by the
Turkish Statistical Agency (Turkstat).
• Credit Card Expenditures: provided quarterly by the BRSA at province level.
Annual figures are then aggregated at the Nuts2 level for 26 regions. Real credit
card expenditures per capita are estimated as the expenditure figures deflated by
regional CPI indices and divided by the regional population.
• Number of Bank Branches: provided quarterly by the BRSA at province level.
Annual figures are then aggregated at the Nuts2 level for 26 regions. Population
per bank branch equals to regional population divided by the number of branches.
• Age: provided as eleven age categories in 5-year intervals. Source: household
labour surveys.
• Civil Status: takes on the value 1 if the individual is married and the couple lives
together, and 0 otherwise. Source: household labour surveys.
• Employment Location: takes on the value 1 if the individual lives in urban areas,
and 0 otherwise. Source: household labour surveys.
• Education: years of completed education, provided under 6 categories, namely; i)
no degree, ii) primary school, iii) secondary school, iv) high school, v) vocational
school and vi) higher education. Source: household labour surveys.
• Social Security Registration: takes on the value 1 if the individual is registered
in the social security administration and 0 otherwise. Source: household labour
surveys.
• Experience: difference between the survey year and the year individual started
working. Source: household labour surveys. Industry classification: categorized
under NACE Rev.1 classification for the survey year 2008 and Nace Rev.2 for
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. Industries include: agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
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electricity, construction, transportation, trade and finance, and community, social
and personal services. Source: household labour surveys.
• Duration of the Job: takes on the value 1 if the work is permanent and 0 otherwise.
Source: household labour surveys. Firm size: measured by the number of people
employed in the firm and classified under 6 categories: i) less than 10 employees, ii)
10-24, iii) 25-49, iv) 50-249, v) 250-499, and vi) 500 and more. Source: household
labour surveys.
• Age Gap: regional average of the age of formal workers divided by the average age
of informal workers. Source: household labour surveys.
• Education Gap: regional average of the education of formal workers divided by
the average education of informal workers. Source: household labour surveys.
• Wage Gap: regional average of the real labour income of formal workers divided
by the average labour income of informal workers. Labour incomes in the surveys
are reported net of taxes. Real labour income for formal and informal workers is
the nominal income deflated by regional CPI index. Source for labour income is
household labour surveys and regional CPI indices are provided by the Turkish
Central Bank.
• Unemployment Rate: provided monthly and annually by Turkstat at the regional
and national level.
• Total Electricity Consumption Per Capita: electricity consumption per kilowatt
hours is provided by the Turkstat at the regional level and includes household
consumption, industrial consumption, commercial consumption, consumption for
agriculture and street lights. Total electricity consumption per capita equals re-
gional electricity consumption divided by the regional population.
• Completed or Partially Completed Residential Buildings and Office Buildings (in
square meters): reported to Turkstat by regional municipalities which are the
responsible bodies to authorize construction permits in Turkey. Turkstat then
disseminates the data at the regional level and annually.
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Table 1.7: Fraction of Workers by Types in Household Surveys, 2008-2012
Formal Informal
Gender
Male 80.7% 69.7%
Female 19.2% 30.3%
Marital Status
Single 21.2% 48.9%
Married 78.8% 51.2%
Age
15-19 2.0% 29.6%
20-24 11.6% 14.3%
25-29 18.7% 6.5%
30-34 22.6% 6.2%
35-39 17.8% 7.5%
40-44 11.9% 20.0%
45-49 7.4% 6.3%
50-54 3.6% 2.7%
55-59 3.9% 5.0%
60-65 0.5% 1.9%
Location
Rural 17.0% 18.2%
Urban 82.9% 81.9%
Duration
Permanent 96.3% 72.5%
Temporary 3.7% 27.5%
Firm Size
Less than 10 43.8% 91.1%
10 to 24 9.1% 4.7%
25 to 49 17.2% 2.4%
50 to 249 18.4% 1.4%
250-449 4.7% 0.2%
500+ 6.7% 0.1%
Years of Experience 7.40 5.30
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Table 1.8: Logit Estimates of Formal Employment Probability-I (Marginal Effects),
2008-2012
(Conditional on being Employed)
VARIABLES Pooled 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real Consumer Credits (per capita) 0.03157*** 0.02293** 0.02383** 0.03482*** 0.04826*** 0.02836***
(0.00614) (0.01093) (0.01162) (0.00854) (0.00922) (0.00853)
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.00334*** -0.00528*** -0.00188* -0.00259* -0.00738*** -0.00470***
(0.00050) (0.00167) (0.00102) (0.00135) (0.00102) (0.00099)
Real Wage Gap 0.00326 0.00752 0.00953 -0.00557 -0.00320 0.00428
(0.00381) (0.00940) (0.00629) (0.00541) (0.01046) (0.01074)
Age Gap -0.33139*** -0.29991* -0.42573*** -0.66281*** -0.28797*** -0.17240*
(0.07117) (0.15860) (0.09575) (0.17633) (0.10396) (0.09799)
Education Gap -0.10955*** -0.13468*** -0.11822*** -0.04533 -0.19182** -0.09525**
(0.03369) (0.03222) (0.04515) (0.05849) (0.08014) (0.04657)
Average Years of Schooling -0.00092 -0.00202 -0.00889 -0.00989 -0.00583 0.02663*
(0.00991) (0.02157) (0.01816) (0.01838) (0.01994) (0.01537)
Electricity consumption (kw, per capita) -0.00893** -0.00368 -0.01295** -0.01594* -0.01113*** -0.00513
(0.00381) (0.00670) (0.00506) (0.00842) (0.00354) (0.00381)
Average Number of Employees at Work 0.00458 0.01058 0.01170 -0.00129 0.04054** 0.02393
(0.00966) (0.01695) (0.01482) (0.01220) (0.01789) (0.02028)
Compl.Residential Buildings (m2, per cap) -0.00528 -0.00051 0.00343 -0.01056 -0.03214*** -0.02941
(0.00411) (0.00639) (0.00592) (0.00843) (0.01115) (0.01858)
Compl.Office Buildings (m2, per cap) -0.08608 -0.19259 -0.06240 -0.10616 -0.50608*** -0.08599*
(0.05536) (0.15374) (0.11387) (0.11370) (0.14241) (0.04606)
Experience 0.01641*** 0.01794*** 0.02039*** 0.01824*** 0.01612*** 0.01186***
(0.00149) (0.00189) (0.00143) (0.00177) (0.00182) (0.00125)
Experience Squared -0.00039*** -0.00042*** -0.00049*** -0.00044*** -0.00037*** -0.00027***
(0.00005) (0.00008) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00004)
Sex Dummy (female=1) -0.03765*** -0.03953*** -0.04000*** -0.03530*** -0.03837*** -0.03371***
(0.00404) (0.00468) (0.00569) (0.00489) (0.00602) (0.00371)
Civil Status Dummy (married=1) 0.02726*** 0.02847*** 0.02500*** 0.02544*** 0.03367*** 0.02491***
(0.00322) (0.00411) (0.00403) (0.00616) (0.00433) (0.00346)
Permanent (permanent=1) 0.10912*** 0.20782*** 0.12466*** 0.09759*** 0.09528*** 0.06500***
(0.00658) (0.01584) (0.00945) (0.00609) (0.00581) (0.00704)
Urban Dummy (urban=1) -0.00301 -0.00982* 0.00171 0.00409 -0.00196 -0.00500
(0.00480) (0.00575) (0.00624) (0.00736) (0.00574) (0.00522)
Primary School 0.06630*** 0.06952*** 0.09006*** 0.07039*** 0.07456*** 0.04309***
(0.00465) (0.00878) (0.01026) (0.00457) (0.00649) (0.00601)
Secondary School (8 years) 0.09199*** 0.09646*** 0.12000*** 0.09203*** 0.10383*** 0.06423***
(0.00550) (0.00853) (0.01258) (0.00601) (0.00787) (0.00620)
High School 0.14497*** 0.15883*** 0.17230*** 0.15398*** 0.15584*** 0.10418***
(0.00802) (0.01540) (0.01359) (0.00928) (0.00853) (0.00782)
Vocational School 0.15437*** 0.16897*** 0.19033*** 0.15307*** 0.16237*** 0.11543***
(0.00959) (0.01454) (0.01951) (0.00779) (0.00967) (0.01025)
Higher Education 0.23230*** 0.24175*** 0.27566*** 0.24038*** 0.25016*** 0.17846***
(0.01119) (0.01605) (0.01870) (0.01083) (0.01397) (0.01324)
Age Group Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sectoral Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES
Observations 437,246 78,020 79,318 88,190 94,606 97,112
Robust and clustered (at region level) standard errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.9: Logit Estimates of Formal Employment Probability-II (Marginal Ef-
fects), 2008-2012
(Conditional on being Employed)
VARIABLES Pooled 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Population Per Bank Branch -0.03716*** -0.03478*** -0.02234* -0.02875*** -0.05733*** -0.03450***
(0.00664) (0.01341) (0.01220) (0.00953) (0.00712) (0.00694)
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.00340*** -0.00505*** -0.00149 -0.00205* -0.00821*** -0.00478***
(0.00049) (0.00158) (0.00093) (0.00120) (0.00092) (0.00085)
Real Wage Gap 0.00332 0.01019 0.00986 -0.00465 -0.00257 0.00283
(0.00390) (0.00895) (0.00635) (0.00568) (0.00847) (0.00937)
Age Gap -0.31618*** -0.25987* -0.44833*** -0.68910*** -0.21964*** -0.16482**
(0.07170) (0.13979) (0.09614) (0.17998) (0.08167) (0.06912)
Education Gap -0.09339*** -0.12857*** -0.12199** -0.05102 -0.16110** -0.06549
(0.03323) (0.03030) (0.04887) (0.06000) (0.06736) (0.04794)
Average Years of Schooling 0.00087 -0.00311 -0.00261 0.00088 0.00122 0.02178
(0.00957) (0.01915) (0.01721) (0.02068) (0.01554) (0.01471)
Electricity consumption (kw, per capita) -0.00656* -0.00227 -0.01315** -0.01663** -0.00458 -0.00188
(0.00395) (0.00607) (0.00517) (0.00845) (0.00310) (0.00335)
Average Number of Employees at Work 0.00376 0.01091 0.01297 0.00448 0.04238*** 0.01741
(0.00814) (0.01524) (0.01381) (0.01002) (0.01513) (0.01591)
Compl.Residential Buildings (m2, per cap) -0.00384 0.00148 0.00269 -0.01347 -0.03194*** -0.02136
(0.00398) (0.00580) (0.00581) (0.00871) (0.00899) (0.01583)
Compl.Office Buildings (m2, per cap) -0.09106* -0.23588 -0.04939 -0.02905 -0.57773*** -0.08437*
(0.04802) (0.14885) (0.10565) (0.12271) (0.13959) (0.04704)
Experience 0.01640*** 0.01796*** 0.02038*** 0.01825*** 0.01609*** 0.01187***
(0.00152) (0.00190) (0.00143) (0.00176) (0.00185) (0.00126)
Experience Squared -0.00039*** -0.00042*** -0.00049*** -0.00044*** -0.00037*** -0.00027***
(0.00005) (0.00008) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00004)
Sex Dummy (female=1) -0.03765*** -0.03957*** -0.03996*** -0.03525*** -0.03840*** -0.03371***
(0.00396) (0.00470) (0.00569) (0.00490) (0.00595) (0.00361)
Civil Status Dummy (married=1) 0.02723*** 0.02846*** 0.02495*** 0.02535*** 0.03355*** 0.02488***
(0.00315) (0.00412) (0.00403) (0.00616) (0.00426) (0.00336)
Permanent (permanent=1) 0.10916*** 0.20815*** 0.12484*** 0.09779*** 0.09502*** 0.06491***
(0.00658) (0.01580) (0.00939) (0.00611) (0.00582) (0.00701)
Urban Dummy (urban=1) -0.00339 -0.01037* 0.00202 0.00437 -0.00231 -0.00545
(0.00491) (0.00568) (0.00638) (0.00750) (0.00573) (0.00508)
Primary School 0.06619*** 0.06952*** 0.09022*** 0.07052*** 0.07416*** 0.04278***
(0.00468) (0.00872) (0.01028) (0.00465) (0.00633) (0.00607)
Secondary School (8 years) 0.09196*** 0.09658*** 0.12014*** 0.09210*** 0.10359*** 0.06400***
(0.00553) (0.00849) (0.01256) (0.00601) (0.00770) (0.00623)
High School 0.14495*** 0.15900*** 0.17235*** 0.15404*** 0.15556*** 0.10406***
(0.00814) (0.01534) (0.01357) (0.00925) (0.00855) (0.00782)
Vocational School 0.15438*** 0.16916*** 0.19047*** 0.15315*** 0.16212*** 0.11521***
(0.00970) (0.01443) (0.01945) (0.00784) (0.00955) (0.01043)
Higher Education 0.23217*** 0.24181*** 0.27582*** 0.24049*** 0.24960*** 0.17812***
(0.01120) (0.01595) (0.01866) (0.01098) (0.01382) (0.01328)
Age Group Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sectoral Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES
Observations 437,246 78,020 79,318 88,190 94,606 97,112
Robust and clustered (at region level) standard errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.11: Two Stage Probit Estimates of Formal Employment Probability,
(Marginal Effects)
Instrumented: i) Real Consumer Credits Per Capita, Columns (1) and (3)
ii) Population Per Branch, Columns (2) and (4)
Instruments: i) Percent of Married Pop. for pooled 2008-2012, Columns (1) and (2)
ii) Religiosity for 2011-2012, Columns (3) and (4)
VARIABLES 2008-2012 2008-2012 2011-2012 2011-2012
Real Consumer Credits (log, per capita) 0.04668*** 0.04197**
(0.01142) (0.01668)
Population Per Branch (log) -0.04730*** -0.05556***
(0.01057) (0.01784)
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.00430*** -0.00423*** -0.00646*** -0.00705***
(0.00064) (0.00060) (0.00098) (0.00105)
Real Wage Gap 0.00577 0.00539 0.00391 0.00523
(0.00438) (0.00444) (0.00942) (0.00884)
Age Gap -0.35177*** -0.36319*** -0.28570*** -0.24288***
(0.09336) (0.08884) (0.09901) (0.09350)
Education Gap -0.12127*** -0.10966*** -0.16722** -0.11149
(0.04089) (0.03945) (0.07552) (0.07612)
Average Years of Schooling -0.00694 -0.00175 0.01475 0.01209
(0.01268) (0.01172) (0.01438) (0.01525)
Electricity consumption (kw, per capita) -0.00832* -0.00675 -0.00946* -0.00300
(0.00460) (0.00473) (0.00487) (0.00601)
Average Number of Employees at Work 0.00008 0.00327 0.02908* 0.02241
(0.01316) (0.01066) (0.01578) (0.01590)
Compl. Residential Buildings (m2, per cap) -0.00375 -0.00401 -0.03560*** -0.02887***
(0.00670) (0.00582) (0.00943) (0.01096)
Compl. Office Buildings (m2, per cap) -0.13070* -0.11620* -0.14650 -0.17485*
(0.06701) (0.06127) (0.09031) (0.09636)
Experience 0.01900*** 0.01899*** 0.01612*** 0.01613***
(0.00164) (0.00164) (0.00163) (0.00168)
Experience Squared -0.00045*** -0.00045*** -0.00037*** -0.00037***
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006)
Sex Dummy (female=1) -0.04656*** -0.04644*** -0.04545*** -0.04561***
(0.00535) (0.00529) (0.00565) (0.00561)
Civil Status Dummy (couple=1) 0.03301*** 0.03281*** 0.03613*** 0.03614***
(0.00401) (0.00396) (0.00449) (0.00436)
Permanent (permanent=1) 0.18072*** 0.18107*** 0.12737*** 0.12699***
(0.01351) (0.01350) (0.01261) (0.01256)
Urban Dummy (urban=1) -0.00442 -0.00420 -0.00404 -0.00511
(0.00613) (0.00605) (0.00656) (0.00626)
Education Dummies YES YES YES YES
Age Group Dummies YES YES YES YES
Firm Size Dummies YES YES YES YES
Sectoral Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 437,246 437,246 191,718 191,718
Robust and clustered (at region level) standard errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.13: Regional Share of Hours Worked Formaly
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Real Credit Card Exp. (per cap., in logs) 0.223
(0.960)
Real Credits (per cap., in logs) 1.975
(4.515)
Pop. Per Bank Branch (per cap, in logs) -14.186*
(7.635)
Unemployment (%) -0.157 -0.154 -0.146
(0.108) (0.107) (0.104)
Electricity consumption (kw, per cap.) 0.022 0.045 0.378
(1.413) (1.393) (1.262)
Average Number of Employees at Work 5.083 4.906 4.155
(2.987) (2.902) (3.037)
Compl. Office Buildings (m2, per cap.) -4.129 -3.928 3.398
(8.047) (7.210) (6.477)
Compl. Res. Buildings (m2, per cap.) 1.500* 1.507* 1.550**
(0.769) (0.739) (0.739)
Real Wage Gap -0.404 -0.390 -0.388
(0.496) (0.477) (0.530)
Average Years of Schooling 16.167*** 16.280*** 16.563***
(2.585) (2.457) (2.640)
Education Gap -12.331** -12.620** -13.038**
(5.392) (5.413) (5.187)
Age Gap 26.816* 26.640* 25.584**
(14.240) (14.219) (12.285)
2009 Dummy -3.307** -2.394 -1.229
(1.256) (2.757) (1.589)
2010 Dummy -3.468*** -2.575 -1.882
(1.089) (2.495) (1.466)
2011 Dummy -2.818*** -2.397 -1.720
(0.989) (1.586) (1.231)
2012 Dummy -3.019*** -2.947*** -2.450***
(0.521) (0.564) (0.569)
Constant -3.841 5.115 125.547*
(20.439) (29.443) (71.203)
Observations 130 130 130
R-squared 0.796 0.797 0.807
Number of clusters 26 26 26
Robust and clustered (at region level) standard errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Early Retirement
Incentives on Labour Supply: Evidence
from Turkey1
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether the early retirement incentives and benefits extended
to men and women during 1990s had any impact on the labour supply decisions of the
individuals. The populist measures taken in 1992 by the government of the time allowed
individuals to be entitled for early retirement based on four criteria; i) the year to start
work, iii) number of years worked, iii) minimum age depending on the year to start work
and iv) number of days for premium contributions. This retirement scheme allowed
women to retire as early as when 38 years old and men to retire when 44 years old.
As the social security deficits started mounting, the government undertook a pension
reform in 1999 which again increased the retirement age to 58 for women and 60 for
men. The 1999 reform, however did not change the entitlement and earned rights of
the individuals who started their work life before 1999, and only affected those who first
register to the social security system as an employee after the enforcement date of the
new Law. Therefore the majority of the current working population were entitled for
1An earlier version this chapter was a joint work with Idil Bilgic¸ Alparslan in which my
contribution was 70% of the total work. This version however is carried out completely by myself
alone and does not include any parts that Ms. Alparslan had previously contributed.
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early retirement over the years and in our sample between 2007-2010. When faced with
early retirement incentives, individuals have the options of i) not to retire and not to
change their labour supply behaviours, ii) to retire and receive benefit income but still
supply their labour, and iii) to retire and withdrawl into inactivity. In this paper we
explore how this incentive scheme affected the participation and hours supplied decisions
of the men and women in Turkey whose earned pension rights were unaffected by the
1999 Pension Reform.
In testing the impact of the scheme, we use the Turkish Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (SILC) data which is European Union’s survey to measure the in-
come, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions across member countries. SILC is
being conducted with similar sampling and methodology across the member countries.
Turkey’s statistical agency Turkstat started to conduct the SILC survey in 2006 in line
with statistical harmonization procedures required for the EU candidate countries. We
use the 2007-2010 panel for Turkey. SILC dataset for Turkey includes rich information
on the social transfers that the individuals and households receive. The reported indi-
vidual benefits in the survey consist of unemployment benefits, pension benefits, widow
and orphanage benefits, old age and disability benefits, scholarships and educational
benefits. The requirement for the benefits to be recorded in the survey is that they need
to be received regularly and from an official institution or foundation. Transfers between
households are not counted in the social benefits received under individual or household
income. Turkstat reports two different total ‘income’ definitions for households, namely;
i) total disposable household income, and ii) total disposable household income excluding
all social benefits received, in addition to reporting each benefit item seperately. As will
be described in detail in the coming sections, the SILC data includes information on the
amount of pension benefits and pension bonuses for the individuals who are retired.
Our main line of theoretical argument is standard and straightforward. Benefits serve
as non-wage income in an intertemporal optimization model where labour-leisure choice
is endogenous. When workers are out of the labour force, they enjoy leisure, which they
lose when they participate in the labour market. In a model with endogenous value of
leisure, the leisure from inactivity depends on the parameters of their utility function
and it will be an increasing function of the wealth that the individual owns. The lump
sum pension bonuses contribute to the wealth of the individual and non-wage pension
income has negative effect on intensive and extensive margin of the labour supplied.
A key aspect for identification in our empirical analysis is that the formal retirement
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(and receiving benefits and bonuses) neither inhibits individuals from participating in
the labour market, nor puts a legal limit on the hours that can be worked by individuals.
We are hence able to investigate the causal effect of retirement incentives on the intensive
and extensive margins of labour supply.
The literature on social benefits mostly focus on the pensions and social security
reforms. As most early retirement schemes around the world are introduced for men and
women not before ages 60-65, the literature is rich in investigating the impact on older
individuals’ labour supply decisions. In that respect, Turkey stands alone in introducing
retirement incentives for much younger generations earlier than 60-65 years old.
Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2010) build a model to simulate a social security reform that
brings a cut of 50% in retirement benefits along with same percentage of cut in the social
security payroll taxes. Their model shows that due to increased savings with life cycle
and precautionary motives, capital stock increases by 10% along with an increase in the
aggregate labour supply by 3%, biggest effect coming from extensive margin. Moreover,
their simulations show that participation rates of workers between the ages 60 and 69
increases from 50% to 62%.
Gruber and Wise (2004) associate the decline in labour force participation rates of
males in United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Japan with the social security incentive systems.
They investigate the social security programs and labor market institutions in 12 coun-
tries and find that a reform that delays benefit eligibility by three years would likely
reduce the proportion of men 56 to 65 out of the labor force between 23 and 36 percent.
Aguila (2012) explores the role of retirement incentives in the Mexican social security
system on the retirement behavior of men ages between 50 and 69 and finds that lower
income employees have more incentive to opt for early retirement whereas the higher
income individuals prefer to delay retirement up to the normal retirement age of 65.
A study by Brinch (2001) looks at the early retirement program that was introduced
in Norway in 1998 for the 62-66 years old. Using a multinominal logit model, eligibility
for 62 years old males is estimated to increase the outflow rate from employment to
inactivity by 10 percentage points, and for 62 years old females by 4 percentage points.
For 63 years old, the effect is similarly estimated at about 6 percentages points for males
and 2.5 percentage points for females. The study then assesses the impact of abolishing
the early retirement program and finds that the labour force participation among older
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men (55-67) may increase to 83 percent from 72 percent by 2005.
A recent NBER paper by Dave et al (2013) explores the impact of the expansion
in the Medicaid eligibility criteria for pregnant women in late 10980 and early 1990s on
the labour supply in US. More specifically, the study investigates whether the expanded
Medicaid eligibility is associated with movement from employed with private insurance
to employed with public insurance and from not employed with private insurance to not
employed with public insurance for pregnant women whose marginal utility of leisure
could increase after birth resulting in crowding out. Dave et al. (2013) find that ex-
pansion of the eligibility was negatively associated with labour force participation and
that the 20 percentage point increase in Medicaid eligibility during the sample period
was associated with a 6% to 7% decrease in the probability that a woman who gave
birth last year was employed. In addition, the study also finds that the 20 percent-
age point increase in the Medicaid eligibility reduced weekly hours worked by 10.2% to
10.5%, whereas wages were 52.5% reduced owing to the 20 percentage points increase in
eligibility.
In identifying the impact of early retirement schemes, we use a regression disconti-
nuity (RD) model where we look at the pool of individuals who satisfy the conditions
outlined in the pension law except maybe for the age criteria. We create an age margin
variable which measures the number of years the individual is away from the cut-off age
within certain bandwidths.2 This gives us a sample of individuals some of whom satisfied
the age criterion and some did not, but this design ensures that we have a treatment
and control group which consist of individuals who are randomized on age conditioning
on satisfying all else criteria. However in our case, satisfying the age criteria and hence
entitlement for retirement do not automatically enforce retirement and compliance is less
than perfect as some individuals choose to retire while some do not after finally meeting
the age criteria. This calls for a Fuzzy RD where the entitlement for retirement (which
is randomized on age) is used as an instrument for actual retirement. We find that the
retirement incentives lead to an average decline of about 16.9 hours in weekly hours
worked by men aged 44-52 and 20.6 hours decline in weekly hours worked by women
who are aged between 39-49 in a bandwidth of three years around the eligible age for
2As will be explained more in detail, the cut-off age is different for several cohorts depending
on the year to start work. For those whose retirement conditions are subject to the pension law
before the 1999 reform, the earliest age is 38 for women who started working before 1981 and it
is 44 for men who started working before 1979. Cut off age goes up to 56 for those women who
started working between 1998 and 1999 and to 58 for men who started the work life in the same
years.
69
retirement. The impact is 18.6 hours decline for men and 29 hours decline for women
in the bandwidth of five years around the age cut-off. Again using the the entitlement
for retirement as an instrument for actual retirement, we estimate that the probability
of participation in the labour force declines by about 37% for men whereas the impact
is insignificant for women.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we explain the outlook of labor
markets in Turkey and explain the pension system in Turkey. Section 3 gives a description
of the data, explains the Fuzzy RD design and present our estimations. Final section
concludes.
2.2 Background on Turkish Labour Markets and
Pension Benefits in Turkey
Turkish labour force in Turkey can be characterized by two sentences; low overall
participation rates and low skills. The overall participation rate between ages 15-64 was
52.4% in 2000, declined to 49.8% in 2006 and increased to 54% by the end of 2012 while
the OECD average was 70.9% and EU-21 average was 72.5% by the end of 2012.3 Gender
breakdown of OECD statistics shows that female participation rate in Turkey was as low
as 23.6% in 2006 and 28.7% in 2012 while for men participation rate was 66.8% in 2006
and 69.2% in 2012. Figure 2.1 shows the labour force participation of men and women
between 1995 and 2013 by age cohorts. Figure clearly shows that the participation fell
significantly for men and women who are between 50-64 until the mid-2000s reflecting
probably the impact of early retirement incentives brought in 1992. The fall is even
shaper for men between 55-65 and for women between 50-60.
In addition to the low participation problem, Turkish labour force is also highly low
skilled. Education profiles of the male and female labour force are described in Table
2.1 and Table 2.2. The statistics show that about 77.3% of women and 66.9% of men in
Turkey have less than 8 years of schooling. The share of women with higher educational
degree in Turkey is only 8.6% while the share with university or above degree is 12.6%
for men. Figures show that participation rates increase with education for both men
and women, for instance the rate is 70.9% for females and 85.3% for men with higher
3OECD Statistics
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(a) Men (b) Women
Figure 2.1: Labour Force Participation Over Time
education, while the rate is 18.6% for women and 49.3% for men with only primary
school education.
Table 2.1: Education Profile of Female Labour Force
Female Not Participating Participating Total
No degree 22.2% 5.1% 27.3%
Primary school (5 years) 24.9% 9.4% 34.3%
Secondary school (8 years) 12.2% 3.5% 15.7%
High school 6.1% 2.7% 8.8%
Vocational school 3.3% 2.1% 5.4%
Higher education 2.5% 6.1% 8.6%
Total 71.2% 28.8% 100.0%
Source: Own estimations using Turkish household labour survey, 2011
The benefit system in Turkey has traditionally been complicated and there are dif-
ferent rules for different transfers, though, major steps to centralize and simplify the
benefit schemes are being taken by the Turkish government in the recent years. The
main responsible government body for social transfers is the General Directorate of So-
cial Benefits under the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in Turkey. A fund, named
Social Solidarity and Aid under this directorate was established in 1986 in order to raise
revenues for redistributive social transfers. Its main mandate is declared by Law 3294
as helping the disadvantaged citizens and taking measures to improve social justice, co-
hesion and income equality. Its revenues are raised from several taxes such as income
and corporate taxes, traffic fines and are transferred to several social aid foundations
to be redistributed to the citizens. According to the 2012 Annual Statistical Report of
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Table 2.2: Education Profile of Male Labour Force
Male Not Participating Participating Total
No degree 4.5% 4.4% 8.9%
Primary school (5 years) 8.9% 27.0% 35.8%
Secondary school (8 years) 7.9% 14.2% 22.1%
High school 3.4% 7.8% 11.2%
Vocational school 1.8% 7.6% 9.4%
Higher education 1.8% 10.7% 12.6%
Total 28.3% 71.7% 100.0%
Source: Own estimations using household labour survey, 2011
the Ministry, the share of social spending in total GDP was about 1.43%. According
to the same report, 2.1 million households and 6.4 million individuals received social
benefits while 70% of the beneficiaries were women and the number of individuals that
were means-tested was 14.5 million. Table 2.3 shows the share of recipients of different
social transfers and the share of transfers as a percent of individual income. As the
table shows the recipient population for pension benefits constitute the highest propor-
tion in the population and range between on average 77.9-79.9% of the total income of
individuals.
Table 2.3: Social Transfers to Individuals between 15-65 (as a % of individual
income)
Benefit Type 2007 2008 2009 2010
Unemployment Benefits 16.7 28.6 31.6 43.8
Recipients as % of population 0.7 0.7 0.5 1.1
Pension Income 79.9 78.9 77.9 78.4
Recipients as % of population 9.5 9.8 10.3 10.9
Widow and Orphan Benefits 88.4 88.0 86.9 86.7
Recipients as % of population 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6
Disability and Old Age Benefits 47.3 48.9 50.2 58.1
Recipients as % of population 0.3 0.24 0.31 3.7
Education Benefits and Scholarships 95.6 90.5 82.4 89.4
Recipients as % of population 0.33 0.034 0.42 0.45
Source: Own estimations using SILC panel surveys 2007-2010, provided by Turkstat
Turkish pension system which operates on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis went through
several amendments since 1950s. The retirement age, which was 60 for both men and
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women in the 1950s, was eliminated by the end of 1969 and later increased to 55 for
women and 60 for men in 1985 by the Turgut Ozal government. In election campaigns of
1991, Suleyman Demirel used the pension benefit reform as a populistic promise in 1991
with the pretext that early retirement incentives would help reduce the youth unemploy-
ment problem. Once he formed a coalition government, one of the first policy measures
he undertook was the amendment in retirement system. In 1992, the Law numbered
3774 was passed by the parliament and the minimum age for retirement entitlement was
reduced to 38 for women and 44 for men.4. But as workers took advantage of the earlier
retirement eligibility, the ratio of active workers to retirees began decreasing and the
deficits start soaring, the government had to undertake a pension reform in 1999 which
once again increased the minimum age for retirement.
For those individuals who started working before 1999; there are four requirements
for male and female workers to satisfy the eligibility criteria for retirement: age criterion,
contribution criterion, year to start work criterion and the minimum number of years of
work criteron. Minimum years of work for male workers is 25 years and 20 years for female
workers whose contributions are paid by either themselves or employers. Age criterion
is minimum 44 years old for those males who are first registered in the social security
system as an employee is between 1976-1979, and goes up to 60 for those males who
are first registered after 1999. Minimum number of days to complete the contribution
payment varies between 5000-7000 days. The minimum age of retirement is 38 for those
women who are first registered in the social security system as an employee before 1981
and minimum age goes up to 58 for those who are registered in the social security system
after year 1999.5 Minimum number of days to complete the contribution payment varies
between 5000-7000 days. The conditions for retirement by age are listed in Table 2.5.
According to our estimations (using population weights) the age distribution of pen-
sioners is as follows: 2.6% are below 45 years old, 48.9% are between 45 and 55 years old
and 48.3% are between 55 and 65 years old. If we look at the age distribution by gender,
we see that about 9% of the female pensioners are below 45, 50% of female pensioners
are between 45-55 and 41% are between 55- 65 years old. As for the males, less than
1% are below 45 years old, 49% are between 45-55 years old and 50% are between 55-65
4Turkish Industry and Business Association Report on Retirement Reforms in
Turkey http://www.tusiad.org.tr/˙˙rsc/shared/file/emek.pdf and Today’s Zaman Column
http://www.todayszaman.com/business˙how-did-the-turkish-social-security-system-end-up-in-a-
bottleneck˙139072.html
5http://www.sgk.gen.tr/ssk/sgk-emeklilik-sartlari.html
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years old.6
2.3 Data and Estimation
The data used in this paper is taken from the Statistics on Income and Living Con-
ditions (SILC) collected annually by the National Statistical Institute of Turkey. Since
2006, Survey on Income and Living Conditions is being used to determine the income
distribution among households and individuals, evaluate the living conditions of peo-
ple, measure the social exclusion and poverty from an income perspective and profile
households. These surveys are conducted every year, providing cross-sectional and panel
datasets. The panel technique used in the collection of data enables us to track individ-
uals and households for multiple periods. 42.77% of the whole sample is followed for 4
years (between 2007 and 2010), 34.59% is followed for 3 years (between 2008 and 2010)
and the remaining of the individuals are surveyed only for the last two years (2009 and
2010). In total, there are 62,619 observations in our dataset, covering the period between
2007 and 2010.
The sample is stratified and clustered where final sampling unit is household and the
results are representative for Turkey. The questionnaire includes questions related to
both households and individuals. Questions for the household are related to the qualities
of the dwelling, environment, level of debt of the household, payments including rent,
expenditure related to the dwelling, economic conditions and self-sufficiency level of the
household and income at household level. Questions asked at individual level investigate
the education levels, health issues, employment status, work history and income of the
individuals of the household.
The reasons why we use the SILC dataset rather than the regular household labour
force micro surveys which are available for more number of years are several. First, the
labour force surveys are rotating panels over 18 months, however the Turkish Statistical
Institute does not provide the unique identifier for the individuals and therefore we
cannot utilize the panel dimension of the surveys. Second, the labour force surveys
do not include information on how many years the individuals regularly and actively
worked for a living. There is information on past employment history, but only for the
6Our sample includes individuals aged between 15-65.
74
one previous work experience of the individuals. Third, the surveys do not include any
information on the type of benefits the individuals receive, be it pension benefits or any
other type. And finally, the age variable is categorially provided in five year intervals in
labour force surveys which makes it not suitable for RD design.7
In this section, we first investigate the impact of early retirement incentives on the
intensive margin, i.e. the hours supplied by the recipients. As the standard theory shows
when the benefits are not conditioned on the labour market status, hours supplied are
negatively related to the benefits to wage income ratio.
Before we proceed, we acknowledge a caveat. The time span we have available for
our dataset is four years and both the changes in participation rates and the change in
the benefits could be driven by the specific business cycle during 2006-2010 rather than
an underlying relationship between the two. There is a large literature on the cyclical
properties of participation and hours worked. Empirical studies on business cycle facts
show that employment in hours worked and participation rates are pro-cyclical whereas
unemployment is counter-cyclical. Search and matching models show that participation
rates should be indeed procyclical due to the fact that expected payoffs from participation
increase as the market returns increase. On the other hand the nonhuman wealth A which
increases the value of leisure does not immediately increase (Pissarides, 2000: p.174).8 In
real business cycle models with intertemporal elasticity of substitution greater than one,
substitution effect outweighs the income effect after a temporary productivity shock and
the agents increase the hours worked in order to take advantage of higher productivity.
In Table 2.4, we display the participation rates, average hours worked per week,
unemployment rates and the real GDP growth. Years 2006, 2007 and 2010 are the
years of high growth whereas 2008 and 2009 are the years of global financial crises.
Table 2.3 on social benefits shows that both the average amount of benefits as a ratio of
individual and household income and the percentage of recipient population have been
mildly increasing or remaining constant for most benefit types during 2007-2010. We see
that male participation rates show very little variability whereas female participation
rates were on the rise after 2008. Although we do not have enough long term data,
not to mention the lack of quarterly data to detrend and check the cross correlations
7Only the more recent surveys starting from 2011 provide the exact age of the survey partic-
ipants.
8Eventually nonhuman wealth also increases by higher savings and participation rate returns
to its original level
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with GDP, the overall movements of participation rates does seem to show very little
variation. Hours worked per week have been mildly falling but there does not seem to
be significant co-movement with GDP growth. Although we acknowledge that monthly
quarterly fluctuations might be damped when annualized in the survey data, over all
there seems to be little change, especially with respect to labour market indicators for
males except for the unemployment rate. Therefore we base our empirical analysis of
the relationship between hours worked and the benefits on the assumption that neither
benefits nor hours worked are driven by GDP movements.
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics on Hours Worked and Participation
Participation Rates 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Overall 46.3 46.2 46.9 47.9 48.8
Male 69.9 69.8 70.1 70.5 70.8
Female 23.6 23.6 24.5 26.0 27.6
Actual Hours Worked Per Week*
Overall 51.3 49.2 49.7 48.4 47.3
Male 54.1 52.0 52.5 51.6 50.4
Female 43.2 41.4 41.9 40.2 39.7
Unemployment Rate 10.2 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9
Real GDP Growth 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.2
*Mean estimated using household labour surveys
In what follows, we start our analysis on the impact of retirement schemes. As
explained in the previous sections, individuals, should their work life start before 1999,
are entitled for early retirement based on four criteria; i) age, ii) the year to start work,
iii) number of years worked and iv) number of days for premium contributions. This
retirement scheme allowed women to retire as early as when 38 years old and men to retire
when 44 years old. In SILC data, we can identify the individuals i) who have worked
actively for at least the number of years stated in the retirement law, ii) who started
working in the years outlined in the retirement law, and iii) whether the individuals are
employed formally (if not yet retired). Using these information, we estimate the impact
of early retirement on the hours worked using a regression discontinuity (RD) design
based on age.
The reason why we focus only on those who are formally employed is because while we
cannot identify whether the individuals completely satisfy the social security contribution
criterion, the formal workers are more likely to have satisfied the condition than those
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who are currently employed informally. One caveat is that in our ‘eligible sample’ there
might be individuals who might have moved between informal and formal employment
during their career path and hence might not qualify for retirement even if they satisfy
all other conditions. This might lead to a bias in our estimations where the hours
worked would have fallen by less due to misidentification for early retirement eligibility
of some. We think, however, that this is not a systematic problem due to the facts that
i) while informally employed, individuals are still allowed to pay premium contributions
themselves, and ii) average years of schooling which is highly correlated with formal
employment probability is significantly higher in our eligible subset as compared to
Turkey population average.
Among those individuals who pass the three eligibility criteria, that is satisfying
the ‘year to start work’ and ‘minimum number of years worked’ condition, and formal
employment status (if not retired), we exploit the differences in hours worked between
those who also satisfy the age condition and those who do not. To this aim, we gener-
ate a margin variable around the cut-off age when the individual becomes entitled for
retirement. The margin variable is estimated as the difference between the age outlined
in the law and the age of the individual in the given survey year, and thus the cut-off
level after which the individual is entitled for pension benefits is zero. The treatment
variable, which is the retirement takes on the value 1 if the individual is retired and re-
ceives pension benefits. Hence, the specification is such that the margin is negative and
the retirement dummy is equal to zero before the cut-off and is positive with retirement
dummy equal to 1 after the cut-off point if the individual is retired. Our aim is to look
into the subset of eligible individuals around the age margin and estimate the impact of
early retirement scheme on average weekly hours worked.
RD design exploits a discontinuity in the treatment to identify a causal effect where
the treatment assignment, wi is determined on the basis of a cut-off score, c, on an
observed forcing variable, xi. In our case, the forcing variable is years to retirement
(measured by the difference between the current age and the age required by law) given
the condition that the individual qualifies in terms of year to start work and mnimum
number of years worked. The cut-off is hence, c=0 when the individual reaches the age
to be qualified for retirement and pension benefits. The individuals whose age falls below
the cut-off within a bandwidth are the control group (wi = 0) and those whose ages are
above and retired are the treatment group (wi = 1). Consider the following specification:
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yi = βwi + f(xi) + +i
∀xi ∈ (c− h, c+ h)
(2.1)
where in our case yi is hours worked, xi is the forcing variable which is the age margin
for retirement, wi is the indicator function of individual i being retired at time t, and h
is a neighbourhood around the cut-off c, hereby referred as the bandwidth. The control
function f(xi) is a p
th order polynomial of the age margin interacted with wi on each
side of c.
The problem with this specificaton, however, is that the probability of treatment after
the cut-off age is not equal to one due to one-sided noncompliance. In other words, there
are individuals who are assigned to receive the treatment, i.e. retirement in our case,
but do not comply with their assignment. On the other hand, those who are assigned
to the control group, i.e. those with negative age margins are not able to circumvent
and receive the treatment. When the compliance is imperfect, the causal inference issues
are analogous to the so-called Intention-to-Treat analysis and answers questions about
the effect of assignment to treatment, rather than the receipt of treatment itself. The
problem which usually arises under imperfect compliance is that if the receipt of the
treatment, wi is not unconfounded, ignoring noncompliance will lead to biased estimates
of the average treatment effects (Imbens and Rubin (2009)). Less than perfect compli-
ance calls for the ‘Fuzzy RD’ design where the jump in the outcome is divided by the
jump in the probability of treatment at the cutoff as opposed to the sharp FD where the
all the subjects assigned to the treatment group are treated. The Fuzzy RD is numeri-
cally equivalent to the IV design where the discontinuity in the probability of treatment
conditional on a covariate becomes an instrument for the treatment status and the result
is the so-called LATE-local average treatment effect (Angrist and Pischke, 2009: pages
250-267). Formally, the estimand is;
βFRD =
limx↓cE[yi|xi = x]− limx↑cE[yi|xi = x]
limx↓cE[wi|xi = x]− limx↑cE[wi|xi = x] (2.2)
In the case of early retirement scheme in Turkey, we rely on Fuzzy RD design due
to the fact that the compliance is less than perfect. Conditioning on having worked the
minimum number of years, year to start the worklife outlined in the law and fullfiling the
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(a) Men (b) Women
Figure 2.2: Probability of Retirement
age criterion, the individuals have three options, i) do not retire, ii) retire and leave the
workforce and iii) retire but still participate in the workforce. We are interested in the
causal impact of retiring and receiving social security benefits on the hours worked for
those individuals who chose options (ii) and (iii). Those individuals however, are very
likely to be different than the ones who do not retire. Therefore the assumption of the
unconfoundedness of the receipt of treatment assumption is also likely to be violated in
our case. Indeed Figure 2.2 shows that at the cut-off point, the probability of retirement
and receipt of social security benefits exhibit a discontinuous increase for both men
and women, but the probability does not go from zero to one at the cut-off for neither
men, nor women. The figures suggest that the Sharp RD design is not appropriate for
estimating the treatment effect of the social security benefits.
On the other hand, assignment to treatment is random in our case because it is
conditioned on the age cut-off for the individuals satisfying all else. Our case also satisfies
the exclusion restriction for non-compliers which is critical for instrumental analysis. For
non-compliers the effect of being entitled for retirement and social security benefits has
no causal effect on hours worked. Changing the assignment for retirement has no causal
impact on hours worked when the level of primary treatment wi does not change. Fuzzy
RD design using the assignment to treatment as an instrument becomes;
wi = α0 + γ0Zi + f1(xi) + i
yi = α1 + βFRDwi + f2(xi) + µi
(2.3)
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(a) Men (b) Women
Figure 2.3: Density of the Age Margin Around the Threshold
where wi is the receipt of the treatment and equal to 1 if the age of the individual
is greater or equal to the cut-off and the individual retired. Zi is the assignment and
equal to 1 if the age of the individual is greater or equal to the cut-off (i.e. the individual
qualifies for retirement). yi denotes the weekly hours worked. Function f˙1(xi) is p
th
order polynomial of the age margin and their interactions with Zi. Function f˙2(xi) is
pth order polynomial of the age margin and their interactions with wi.
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Before estimating equation 2.3, we start with basic RD diagnostics. We first ex-
amine whether the density of the forcing variable, the age margin is continous at the
discountinuity. Figure 2.3 shows the histogram of the age margin for men and women
and none of them reveal any signs of manipulation around the cut-off point.10 One of
the recommended tests in every analysis involving RD is the McCrary Density Test.
McCrary (2007) shows that this test is an extension of the local linear density estimator
which proceeds in two steps. In the first step, one obtains a finely-gridded histogram. In
the second step, one smooths the histogram using local linear regression, separately on
either side of the cut off. Due to the discrete nature of the age margin data, however,
we do not implement this test as local linear regressions might not perform well with
discrete data.
9Although our dataset is a panel, Lee and Lemieux (2009; pages 61-62) suggest that including
fixed effects is unnecessary for identification in RD models unlike in the more traditional settings
in which the time invariant error component is correlated with the observed covariates. Authors
suggest that the source of identification is a comparison between those just below and above
the cut off and can be carried out with a single cross-section and imposing a specific dynamic
structure introduces more restrictions without any gain in identification.
10Note that due to the low female participation in Turkey, the number of observations for
eligible women are a quarter of that of men and the density exhibits a noiser distribution.
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Next, we perform another standard check and inspect the control variables at the
discontinuity that later will be included in the regressions. The covariates which are
aimed to capture the socio-economic characteristics of the individuals are; i) difficulty
of subsistence: a measure of whether the individuals strive to make end meets in a scale
between 1-6, 1 standing for very difficult and 6 standing for very easy, ii) accomoda-
tion ownership: scaled as 1=own dwelling, 2=rented, 3=public housing and 4=other
free housing, iii) civil status: shows whether the individuals are married (0=married,
1=single), iv) dependent children: a dummy variable denoting whether the individuals
have at least one dependent child in the household, v) educational attainment covariates,
and vi) income group dummies. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide summary statistics on the
outcome variables and covariates for groups below and above the cut-off age.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 represent the local averages of the covariates plotted against the
age margin with regression lines fitted using 4th degree polynomials.11 In Figures 2.4
and 2.5, we do not observe any significant jumps at the treshold. The share of university
graduates seems to be significantly higher at the positive side of the age margin. This
could be due to the fact that it is less likely for the university graduates to satisfy the
minimum years of work criterion and at the same time be relatively young to fulfill
the age criteria, as they happen to start the worklife at an older age than high school
graduates due to longer education. As for individuals with lower educational degrees on
the other hand, they are more likely to fulfill the minimum number of years worked as
they start working earlier in life, but precisely due to this reason, they might be less
likely to fulfill the age criterion in comparative terms. And hence the uneven clustering
of university graduates to the right of the treshold.
Covariate data for women, on the other hand show a noiser pattern especially for
educational attainment variables. Entitlement for retirement is not linked to education,
however, as in the case of men, women with university degrees might be more likely to
satisfy both the age and minimum number of years worked condition, especially taking
into account the fact that women who participate in the workforce are more likely to
be university graduates. Moreover, women with tertiary degrees are more likely to have
taken shorter maternity leaves and spells and therefore might be more likely to be over-
represented on the right of the treshold.12. In addition to the noisy pattern in educational
11Number of observations fall down on both far ends of the cut-off, therefore local averages
exhibit a noisy pattern at the tails.
12Laws regulating maternity leave were changed only recently in 2013 and the leave duration
was increased from 16 weeks to just 18 weeks
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attainment variables, there seems to be a slight discontinuity for dependent children.
Although it is another subject for research, women who would like to have another child
might be more likely to retire early as compared to the women completed their fertility
window. This, however would confirm the earlier concern that the unconfoundedness
assumption with respect to treatment might be violated. This provides another reason
to rely on Fuzzy RD/IV design for the case of early retirement.
Before we move to present the results of the Fuzzy RD/2SLS estimations, we show a
graphical illustration of the relationship between the social security benefits and hours
worked in Figure 2.6. For both men and women, we plot the local averages of the weekly
hours worked against the age margin under two alternative fitted regression lines. In
all four panels, we see a decrease in the hours worked for both men and women to the
right of the cut-off, however, the initial discontinuous jump does not indicate a dramatic
behavioural change. The graphical evidence provides further support for the Fuzzy RD
design where the receipt of the treatment is treated as endogenous and needs to be
instrumented.
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(a) Difficulty of Subsistence (b) Accomodation Type
(c) Civil Status (d) Having Dependent Children
(e) Primary School Graduates (f) Secondary School Graduates
(g) High School Graduates (h) University Graduates
Figure 2.4: Covariate Checks for Men Around Age Margin
Note: The panels refer to the sample means of following covariates on each side of the treshold: i) Difficulty of
subsistence is a measure of whether the individuals strive to make end meets in a scale between 1-6, 1 standing
for very difficult and 6 standing for very easy, ii) Accomodation ownership is a measure of whether the
individuals own the dwelling. It’s scaled as 1=own dwelling, 2=rented, 3=public housing and 4=other free
housing. iii) Civil status shows whether the individuals are married (0=married, 1=single). iv) Dependent
children is a dummy variable denoting whether the individuals have at least one dependent child in the
household, v) the rest are educational attainment covariates.
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(a) Difficulty of Subsistence (b) Accomodation Type
(c) Civil Status (d) Having Dependent Children
(e) Primary School Graduates (f) Secondary School Graduates
(g) High School Graduates (h) University Graduates
Figure 2.5: Covariate Checks for Women Around Age Margin
Note: The panels refer to the sample means of following covariates on each side of the treshold: i) Difficulty of
subsistence is a measure of whether the individuals strive to make end meets in a scale between 1-6, 1 standing
for very difficult and 6 standing for very easy, ii) Accomodation ownership is a measure of whether the
individuals own the dwelling. It’s scaled as 1=own dwelling, 2=rented, 3=public housing and 4=other free
housing. iii) Civil status shows whether the individuals are married (0=married, 1=single). iv) Dependent
children is a dummy variable denoting whether the individuals have at least one dependent child in the
household, v) the rest are educational attainment covariates.
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(a) Men (b) Women
Figure 2.6: Average Weekly Hours Worked Around Age Margin
Note: The graphs show evenly-spaced binned sample means for the weekly hours worked on each side of the
threshold. The solid lines represent the predicted values based on a fourth order (in the top panel) and first
order polynomial (bottom panel).
Lee and Card (2008) show that when the forcing variable has discrete support (as
in our case), the conditions for non-parametric or semi-parametric methods are not
satisfied and the treatment effect is not non-parametrically identified. They suggest that
parametric specifications with clustering on the forcing variable will yield consistent
estimates of the treatment. In our regressions below, we follow the recommendation of
both Lee and Card (2008) and cluster on the the age margin. Gelman and Imbens (2014)
suggest that high-order polynomial regressions have poor properties and argue that they
should not be used in regression discontinuity designs due to the facts that i) results are
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sensitive to the order of the polynomial, ii) there are no good proven method for choosing
the order of the polynomial, iii) inference based on higher order polynomials are often
poor, and iv) high-order polynomial regressions often lead to confidence intervals that
fail to include zero with probability substantially higher than the nominal Type 1 error
rate. Gelman and Imbens (2014) hence recommend using estimators based on local linear
or quadratic polynomials or other smooth functions. We follow the advise by Gelman
and Imbens (2014) and use linear and qudratic polynomials.13
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) propose an algorithm to find an optimal band-
width, as there is a trade off between bias and efficiency, i.e., setting a high h could
result in high bias whereas low h might lead to noisy estimates.14 In our case however,
the data is discrete and bins are not continuous. Angrist and Pischke (2009) recommend
restricting the sample to points near the discontinuity and then get rid of most or all
the polynomial controls in parametric 2SLS set ups.15. We therefore estimate equation
2.1 under alternative bandwidths of ±10, ±5 and ±3.
The results are presented in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Using the entire sample of eligible
individuals, we find that the impact of early retirement entitlement is 22 decline hours
for men and 17 hours for women. Specification with quadratic polynomial reduces the
hours almost by half, but at the same time reduces R2 by almost a quarter for men.
As for women, the hours work declines by 13, which is close to the linear specification
but insignificant. However, the R2 is negative, a sign of very poor fit. When we restrict
the sample around the bandwidth of ±10 local average treatment effect of retirement is
estimated as 18.9 hours decline for men and 19.1 hours decline for women. As in the
case of full sample, quadratic specification reduces the decline in hours worked to 12.6
from 18.3 for men but increases it to 31.8 hours from 19.1 for women. Restricting the
sample further around the bandwidths of ±5 and ±3 yields very similar estimations of
the effect at 17-18 hours for men. For women, on the other impact differs significantly
depending on the bandwidth chosen. Local average treatment effect on hours worked
is estimated as a decline of 29 hours for sub-sample in bandwidth ±5 and 20.6 hours
13In all our regressions the Akaike Information Criterion favors linear specification over
quadratic, cubic and quartic polynomials.
14One recommended way in the literature to deal with bias is to add more polynomial and
interaction terms than needed and explore how the RD estimates are robust to the inclusion of
higher order polynomials (Lee and Lemieux, 2009; page 39).
15Angrist and Pischke (2009; page 263) suggest that 2SLS estimates in discontinuity samples
with few controls will be broadly consistent with the more precise estimates constructed using
the larger sample.
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decline for bandwidth ±3, therefore the results are less conclusive.
What do these figures mean economically? We make a very simple back-of-the-
envelope estimation. Turkstat provides annual total hours worked in the economy while
the Social Security Institution (SSI) provides the number of pensioners by years and by
age.16 Within 3 year age margin bandwidth, our sub-sample includes men aged between
36-57 and women of ages between 36-55 while the local average treatment effect is esti-
mated as 16.9 and 20.6 hours decline in weekly hours worked. Taking into consideration
the fact that minimum retirement age for men is 44 and for women 38, and hence looking
at the number of male retirees aged between 44-57 and 38-55 for women, we estimate
the loss in total hours worked for those sub-groups. Our simple and static calculation
shows that the loss in annual total hours worked was 2.1% in 2007, 1.9% in 2008, 1.8%
in 2009 and 1.3% in 2010. If we expand the bandwidth of age margin to 10 years and
use the estimations of 18.9 and 19.1 hours decline for men and women, the static total
loss in annual hours is 3.1% for 2007, 2.7% for 2008, 2.7% for 2009, and 2.1% for 2010.17
Early Retirement Eligibility and Labour Force Participation
In the previous section, we looked at the decline in the hours supplied by the labour
force who were within the window of eligibility for retirement between 2007-2010. The
analysis above did not rule out the fact that individuals can still supply their labour
while being a retiree and receiving pension benefits. In this sub-section, we investigate
how the eligibility and actual retirement affects participation decision in the labour force
and how the likelyhood of participation changes when individuals retire at an age much
earlier than 65. As in the previous section, we focus only on the same individuals who
meet the criteria for retirement because our purpose is not to explore the determinants
of overall participation but the change in the participation behaviour due to retirement
eligibility. As before we have a sub-sample of individuals all of whom fulfill the minimum
number of years worked and started working within the years outlined in the law. Again
as before, some of the individuals fulfill the minimum age condition and some do not
and this provides us with a sample of individuals randomized on age.
We first run OLS with fixed effects utilizing the panel dimension of our data set
16Our estimation of the number of retirees using the population weights are consistent with
SSI figures.
17Since this estimation does not take into account any dynamic trajectories in hours worked and
since it excludes the population aged between 57-65 for men and 55-65 for women, it represents
a lower bound for the loss in total hours.
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to establish the relationship between the retirement and participation decisions. Our
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the individual
who participates in the labour force and zero if the individual is inactive. We run
three different specifications; in the first one we use the entitlement dummy (i.e. if the
individual satisfies the age criterion in addition to the others), in the second one we use
retirement dummy, and in the third specification we use shares of pension benefits and
pension bonuses in total income as independent variables. The reasoning for the first
specification is that in a way we would like to test whether entitlement has indeed no
direct impact on participation decision other than its impact through retirement. In all
specifications, we use the same control variables as before.
The estimations are summarized in Table 2.10. As expected, in the first set of
specifications for men and women, once conditioned on age margin entitlement has no
direct impact on the labour force participation decision. The coefficients for both men
and women are insignificant albeit with the correct sign. In columns (3) and (4) we
investigate the impact of actual retirement on participation decisions for men and women.
Our estimations show that the probability of participation falls by 28.6% on average for
men who retire at an earlier age than 65. On the other hand, the impact is insignificant
for women alhough it has the expected sign. And in the last specification, instead of
using the retirement dummy as the explanatory variable, we use the shares of pension
benefits in total income of the individual and the share of pension bonuses to explore how
much the probability of participation changes when pension-related benefits increase as
a share. We find that for men, a percentage point increase in the benefit to total income
reduces the participation by 0.4% while a percentage point increase in share of bonuses
reduce the participation by 0.5%. The figures mean that a 10%point increases in both
types of benefits would reduce the probability of participaton about 9% on average all
together. However, as in the earlier specification, the coefficients of pension benefits are
insignificant for women.
The estimations show significant reduction in the probability of employment for men
however the results would be biased if the decision to retire are correlated with the error
term. Indeed, there could be reasons not captured by the data why some individuals
chose to retire at a productive age and why some others do not. So as in the previous
section, we use the entitlement as an instrument for the decision to retire and estimate
the impact on labour force participation by two stage least squares.
Table 2.11 summarizes the results of two stage least squares estimations for men
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and women. We instrument the retirement dummy with entitlement dummy and the
interaction of the age margin with retirement is instrumented with the interaction of
age margin with entitlement. In the first stage of estimations for men both F statistics
are higher than the rule of thumb 10 and the coefficients of the instruments are highly
significantly with expected signs. Using the entitlement dummy as an instrument for
retirement, we find that retirement reduces the probability of labour force participation
as much as 37.8% for men, which is not a negligible decline. Moreover, once the individual
retires, the probability of participation further falls by about 2.6% each year as the
individual ages. On the other hand, as in the case of OLS, the estimations for women are
insignificant and the first stage statistics are quite weak both in terms of the F statistics
and instrument coefficient significance. The inconclusive results for women could be due
to the fact that the participation of women is already very low and therefore looking at
a small subset of women who meets the retirement criteria results in noisy estimates.
Moreover, cultural perception diversity for women’s role in economic life across diffent
parts of Turkey and the fertility decisions of women might be complicating participation
decisions, which we might not be able to capture although we use several controls and
fixed effects in our analysis. In Turkey, labour force participation of women is high only
among university graduates and those women are more likely to be over represented
in our sample of women who meet retirement criteria.18 The university graduates on
the other hand might have more ambitious career plans reflecting different work-leisure
preferences and therefore might not be tempted for inactivity due to early retirement
incentives.
2.4 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the impact of an early retirement law that was passed
in 1992 on the labour supply decisons of the individuals in Turkey. The early retirement
scheme brought incentives to retire as early as at 38 years old for women and 44 years old
for men when the individual satisfies the minimum years of work, the year to start work
and premium contribution conditions. The Retirement Law was reformed in 1999 and
minimum age was increased again but the reform did not affect those individuals who
started working before 1999. In order to estimate the impact of the early retirement
incentives, we use the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) panel data
18Indeed the share of university graduates is about 50% in our sample.
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between 2007-2010 which includes rich information on the labour force history of the
individuals as well as on different income sources such as social benefits and pension
related income.
In establishing the causal impact, we use a Regression Discontinuity design in which
among the individuals who pass the three eligibility criteria, that is satisfying the ‘year
to start work’ and ‘minimum number of years worked’ condition, and formal employ-
ment status (if not retired), we exploit the differences in hours worked between those
who also satisfy the age condition and are retired with those who do not meet the age
condition. Our aim is to look into the subset of eligible individuals divided into control
and treatment groups around the age margin and estimate the impact of early retirement
scheme on average weekly hours worked. However, once the individual passes cut-off age,
he/she might not opt for retirement and hence the compliance is imperfect in our case
in contrast to the Sharp RD design. Imperfect compliance calls for the Fuzzy RD in
which eligibility for retirement (which is randomized on age) is used as an instrument
for actual retirement.
We find that the local average treatment effect of the early retirement scheme is
about 16.9 hours decline in the weekly hours worked by men aged 44-52 and 20.6 hours
decline in weekly hours worked by women who are aged between 39-49 in a bandwidth of
three years around the cut-off age for retirement. Moreover, we find that the entitlement
for retirement after 44 years old reduced the probability of labour force participation of
men by about 28% to 37% in the course of 2007-2010 while we did not find a statistically
meaningful impact on the participation decisions of women. Our findings in this paper
are consistent with other findings in the literature such as Gruber and Wise (2004) and
Aguila (2012) where early retirement incentives are shown to significantly distort the
labour supply decisions on individuals.
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Table 2.11: 2SLS Estimations of Labour Force Participation
Instrumented: Retirement
Instrument: Entitlement For Retirement
2SLS 2SLS
Men Women
(1) (2)
Age Margin 0.010 0.007
(0.018) (0.009)
Retirement Dummy -0.378* -0.064
(0.197) (0.066)
Age Margin*Retirement -0.026* 0.040
(0.015) (0.027)
Individual Controls Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,005 262
R-squared 0.525 0.809
First Stage
F Statistics
Retirement Dummy 11.7 2.36
Age Margin*Retirement 93.6 9.19
Coefficients for Instrumenting the Retirement Dummy
Entitlement Dummy 0.0711** 0.2622*
(0.029) (0.139)
Age Margin*Entitlement 0.0379*** 0.322
(0.008) (0.267)
Coefficients for Instrumenting Age Margin*Retirement
Entitlement Dummy 0.1286*** 0.1303
(0.045) (0.1522)
Age Margin*Entitlement 0.6619*** 0.5732***
(0.048) (0.143)
Notes:
(1) Robust and clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) Individual controls in all columns are educational dummies, a measure of difficulty of subsistance,
civil status, existence of dependent children, accomodation ownership, income group and sector dummies.
(3) The sample includes men and women aged between 34-61.
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Chapter 3
Effectiveness of Stabilization Funds in
Managing Volatility in Oil-Rich
Countries
3.1 Introduction:
Fluctuating natural resource and commodity prices typically create boom and bust
cycles in the natural resource rich economies and lead to an erratic growth performance
under the absence of prudent fiscal policies. Stabilization Funds are special purpose in-
vestment funds or arrangements created by governments for macroeconomic management
purposes. They hold and manage assets that are proceeds of natural resource/commodity
export revenues, balance of payments surpluses, privatization or foreign currency oper-
ations. These special purpose funds include sovereign wealth funds, fiscal stabilization
funds, savings funds, reserve investment corporations, development funds, and pension
reserve funds without liabilities. According to the data by the Sovereign Wealth Instu-
tite, the total asset size of the sovereign wealth funds worldwide is about USD 6,020
billion, USD 3,529 billion of which is oil and gas related.1 The focus of this paper is to
investigate the effectiveness of stabilization and savings funds that are established to ac-
cumulate oil and gas revenues to finance certain investments and expenditures or smooth
the fiscal revenues in the face of highly volatile international prices. By ‘effectiveness’ I
1http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/
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mainly refer to the degree of fiscal countercyclicality or acyclicality given the objective
of smoothing fiscal expenditures and revenues through creating a ‘tool’ for saving.
The question of whether the stabilization funds are effective is an important one
because in a way, it relates to the broader discussion whether the fiscal policy in de-
veloping countries have become less procyclical. A recent study by Frankel, Vegh and
Vuletin (2012) show that there is a group of countries that have graduated from fiscal
procyclicality, meaning that the fiscal policy have become countercyclical. One third of
the countries in the ‘graduation list’ however comprises countries that are resource rich
and have a stabilization fund in place.2 The study by Frankel et al (2012) argue that the
main determinant whether a country graduates from procyclicality is the institutional
quality. The measures of instutional quality used in the study are the International Coun-
try Risk Guide dataset, however, the study also acknowledges the potential endogeneity
problem where the cyclicality of fiscal policies might affect the institutional quality. In
order to address these concerns, the study instruments institutional quality measures by
European settler mortality and latitude variables a la Acemoglu et al. (2001). Using
aso revelant instruments for other potentially endogenous variables, the study concludes
that there is a strong causal link from better institutions to less procyclical policies. As
I will show below, some part of the graduation is actually due to creating a mechanism
to further tie the hands of the governments in oil rich countries, even after controlling
for institutional quality differences.
From a theoretical point of view, there would be no reason for any resource rich
country to establish stabilization or savings funds if there were perfect insurance mar-
kets. However, the experience shows that the number of such funds started to increase
dramatically especially towards the end of 1990s and most of the oil producer countries
seem to have relied upon funds, rather than relying on insurance markets. Moreover,
there is a vast literature showing that the external capital inflows are highly procycli-
cal, making borrowing more difficult during times of negative shocks. Therefore during
the times of high capital inflows, the business cycles are further exacerbated through
expansionary fiscal policies. This phenomenon is described as ‘when it rains, it pours’
by Kamisnky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004). Ilzetski (2011) show that a political economy
2Graduated countries in the list are Algeria, Bahrain, Chile, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bolvia, Botswana, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, El
Salvador, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Paraguay, Phillipines, Syrian
Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda and Zambia where the first nine have a stabilization fund in
place. See Frankel et al. (2013, Fig.4)
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model with resdistributive government policies and borrowing constraints can explain
procyclical fiscal policies only during economic downturns, and introducing political po-
larization to the model significantly improves the ability to explain differences in fiscal
policy accross countries.3
In this paper, I take an agnostic view on whether the international capital markets
are imperfect as well as on why any country would pursue a procyclical fiscal policy that
aggrevates the business cycles. In line with the theoretical prescriptions, I assume that
the optimal fiscal policy is either countercyclical (in a Keynesian setting) or acyclical
following Barro’s tax smoothing result (in the Neoclassical setting).4 I take the view
that it might be due to the fact that stabilization funds provide a mechanism for self-
insurance to accumulate resources and smooth expenditures, and this might be the reason
why resource rich countries which are vulnerable to external conditions have started to
rely on them one after another. In this paper, I ask the question whether such funds
indeed help countries to achive better fiscal policy outcomes that are closer to the optimal
fiscal policy framework prescribed by the theory.5
I use a sample of 29 oil-rich countries, namely; Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam and Yemen for the period between 1980-2012. I find that
the fiscal policy is indeed highly procyclical in oil-rich countries without funds and they
are mildly procyclical or acyclical in countries with stabilization or savings funds. More-
over, I find evidence that the volatility of major macro variables of interest such as the
volatility of real household consumption, real government expenditures and government
consumption as well as gross fixed capital investments are lower in those countries with
such funds. Running seperate estimations only for countries with funds for the 1980-2012
period show that the procyclicality result becomes statistically insignificant (before and
after), supporting the view that countries that establish such saving mechanisms might
be more prudent to start with as opposed to countries without funds. If so, the results are
supportive of Frankel et al (2012) who suggest that the ‘graduating class’ are the more
3For a discussion of causes of procyclical fiscal policies in developing countries, see Ilzetski
(2011) and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007, p.4-6)
4For a short discussion, see Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008, p.4-6)
5By ‘outcomes’, I mean ‘directly controllable fiscal policy realizations’ such as government
expenditures rather than budget balance which is not entirely controllable by the government
due to revenue collection aspect. I will elaborate this point in Section 2.
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prudent ones with better institutions, although I do not find a statistically significant
association between fiscal performance and institutional quality in my sample of oil-rich
countries.6.
This paper is among the few to investigate whether stabilization or savings funds
deliver more desirable outcomes. The existing results in the literature with respect to the
experience with funds are mixed though. A case study by Fasano (2000) suggests that in
some countries like Kuwait, Norway and State of Alaska, savings funds have contributed
to enhancing the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making the budget expenditures less
driven by revenue availability, whereas in other countries the experience has been less
successful because of frequent changes to fund rules and the deviation from its intended
purposes.7 Fasano (2000) suggests that such funds have been more successful in countries
with a strong commitment to fiscal discipline and sound macroeconomic management
and the experience shows that funds should not be considered as a substitute for sound
fiscal management. Another study by Husain, Tazhibayeva and Ter-Martirosyan (2008)
suggests that the economic output in oil-exporting countries is strongly affected by oil
prices and investigate whether the world oil price changes have an independent influence
on economic activity or whether the channel is through the impact of procyclical fiscal
policies on the economic activity.8 Findings support the view that procyclical fiscal
policies in oil exporting countries is the main mechanism by which oil price shocks are
transmitted to the non-oil economy.
The study by Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) uses a panel data set consisting of 15 oil-rich
countries with and without stabilization funds for the period 1973-2003. The question
they ask is whether having a stabilization fund is associated with having lower volatility
in an oil-rich economy. The study finds evidence of a robust negative relationship be-
tween the existence of an oil fund and inflation, volatility of broad money, real exchange
rate and prices in oil-exporting countries. Main challenges in establishing a robust em-
pirical relation between the existence of stabilization funds and better fiscal outcomes
are unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and the difficulty of distinguishing the impact
6Insignificance of the coefficients for institutional quality measures could be due to the fact
that there is not much institutional quality variation across countries, with the exception of
Norway
7The study covers the experience of Norway, Chile, Venezuela, State of Alaska, Kuwait and
Oman.
8The study estimates impulse responses to oil shocks based on panel VARs of oil prices, fiscal
stance and output. The countries analyzed include Iran, Norway, Yemen, Algeria, U.A.E. Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Oman and Kuwait.
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of the introduction of funds which overlap with the beginning of an oil-boom. The study
partially addresses these challenges by using fixed effects estimator to remove the impact
of time-invariant variables. The econometric specification however, cannot capture the
role of time-variant factors and endogeneity of oil funds.
Ossowski, Villafuerte, Medas and Thomas (2008) also use panel data consisting of
32 oil-rich countries with and without a stabilization fund and/or a fiscal rule in place
between 1992 and 2005.9 The empirical question is whether having a stabilization fund
and/or a fiscal policy rule leads to i) lower change in non-oil primary primary balance as
a percent of non-oil GDP , ii) lower change in real government expenditures, iii) lower
ratio of the change in expenditures to the change in oil revenues in an oil-rich country.
Prefered specification is fixed effects estimator again to address the problem of time-
invariant factors affecting the outcome variables. In addition, Arellano and Bond (1991)
dynamic GMM estimator is introduced to address the possible endogeneity problem,
i.e. a fiscal rule/fund could be introduced because of the existence of imprudent fiscal
outcomes. The study controls for the institutional factors using International Country
Risk Guide data on democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality, government stability
and law and order. Contrary to the findings of Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007), Ossowski,
Villafuerte, Medas and Thomas (2008) cannot find evidence of a positive impact on
fiscal outcomes.
A survey by Devlin and Titman (2004) suggests that the extent to which savings
and stabilization funds can smooth out investment and revenues depends on the random
process generating the commodity/natural resource prices. When price changes are
mean-reverting, the present value of the future revenues are not strongly affected by
the spot prices therefore will not diminish the efficiency of funding for expenditures,
whereas with a random walk process/permanent price changes, present value of future
oil revenues will be large, and so will be the optimal level of investment. In that case,
financial instruments rather than stabilization or savings funds will be more effective to
deal with the fluctuations caused by price changes. When price changes are permanent,
stabilization funds end up constantly accumulating or depleting assets which do not
help reduce the volatility in the economy. However, this is a channel which has not been
investigated in by the empirical literature on the effectiveness of stabilization funds. The
evidence on whether the oil prices are mean-reverting though is mixed. Pindyck (1999)
and Barnett and Vivanco (2003) show evidence on mean-reversion whereas Cashin, Liang
9Their analysis covers the oil-producing countries where fiscal revenue accounted for at least
20 percent of total fiscal revenue in 2004.
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and McDermott (2000) and Engel and Valdes (2000) find evidence of persistence. Bartsch
(2006) makes the point that the international oil prices show very weak mean reversion
and studies the implications and fiscal policy design for Nigeria. The study suggests that
Nigeria as an oil producing country should base its estimates of expected revenues and
expenditures on the moving averages of past oil prices because the long-term average
oil price is of little use for policy making due to weak mean reversion. Using moving
averages of three to five years would lead to smallest forecast error, and reduce the risk
of building large and persistent surpluses or deficits given the slow mean reversion of oil
prices.
I believe that the existing studies, albeit enlightening do not sufficiently answer the
question whether such funds are effective and should be prescibed for any resource rich
country. The existing analyses do not differentiate between long-run trend or cyclical
fluctuations, do not investigate the outcomes in line with optimal fiscal policy prescrip-
tions, do not carefully handle the problem of potential endogeneity of GDP, the decision
to establish a fund and th institutions. And finally, existing studies do not properly
assess the volatility although the economic theory suggests that there are welfare costs
of business cycle fluctuations. Moreover, I believe that those studies focus on the wrong
fiscal policy outcomes which are usually not directly controllable by fiscal agencies. In
this paper, I aim to contribute to the existing literature by addressing all these missing
key dimensions, especially the endogeneity issue. More specifically, in order to address
the endogeneity between the GDP and government expenditures, I use the external
shock instrument for the GDP, as proposed by Jaimovich and Panizza (2007). As for
the endogeneity of the ‘decision to establish a fund’, I use urbanization, and the lags of
both the average years of schooling and percent of population with tertiary education in
order to proxy for awareness for ‘better management of people’s resources’. As it will
be explained in more detail in Section 3, as an extention, I interact the urbanization
with the number of other oil-rich countries and use this new variable along the freedom
of press rating as an alternative proxy for information for use of resources. And finally,
in order to address the potential endogeneity of the institutions, I use 5th and 10th lags
of average ICRG ratings of the neighouring countries for each of the oil-rich country in
question. Table 3.4 summarizes each sets of instruments for the potentially endogenous
variables.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical strategy and the
data. Section 3 describes the results of the econometric analysis where I; i) investigate
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the cyclical properties under existence of oil funds using OLS and Two Stage Least
Squares Methods, ii) explore the decision to establish a stabilization fund (which is not
a truly exogenous event) using several instruments, iii) instrument institutions which
might potentially be endogenous, iv) investigate the short term growth and volatility of
real general government expenditures, general government final consumption, household
final consumption, and gross fixed capital formation as the variables of interest. Section
4 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Specification and Data
The experience with stabilization funds is relatively new as most of the funds were
established by the end of 1990s and after year 2000. As Figure 1 shows, there were
only 5 countries with oil stabilization funds as of 1994, whereas after that date, 16 more
oil-rich countries adopted some sort of a fund arrangement. Although it is an important
question whether these funds have been effective, the current empirical literature on the
experience so far is limited.
Figure 3.1: Number of Countries with Oil Stabilization, Savings or Sovereign Funds
As summarized in the previous section, to my knowledge, there are only two studies
that have the similar objectives as mine and their findings are somewhat contradictory.
The study by Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) which covers the period 1973-2003 for 15 oil-rich
countries finds that countries with a stabilization fund are more likely to have less volatile
broad money, real exchange rate and prices. And the study by Ossowski, Villafuerte,
Medas and Thomas (2008) uses a panel data of 32 countries between 1992 and 2005
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and cannot find evidence that having a stabilization fund leads to better fiscal outcomes
measured by change in non-oil primary balance to non-oil GDP and real government
expenditures. The major problem with respect to measuring fiscal policy performance
through any definition of budget balance is that such outcomes are beyond the full
control of the policy makers and can lead to misleading conclusions. Tax revenues
are highly cyclical, and therefore even if government engages in a completely neutral
policy of smooth fiscal expenditures, this measure would tell us that the fiscal policy is
countercyclical, being in surplus in goodtimes and in deficit in bad times. This point
has been raised by Kamisky, Reinhart, Vegh (2004), Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) and
Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and Vegh and Vuletin (2013).10 Therefore, we follow the advise
and measure fiscal outcome as general government expenditures in real and detrended
log terms, i.e. cyclical government expenditures.
The novelty of this paper is as follows; I embrace a different perspective focusing di-
rectly on the degree of procyclicality and volatility of expenditures when evaluating the
performance under stabilization funds. Moreover, as compared to the previous studies
on this issue, I am able to cover more recent data, namely the period between 1980 and
2012 for a sample of 29 oil-rich countries, namely; Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam and Yemen.11 Table 1 provides the list of countries and
Table 2, their various oil-dependency measures.
Experience shows that in oil rich countries government expenditures track oil rev-
enues very closely which leads to an erratic fiscal performance and exacerbate the boom
and bust cycles due to changing oil prices in the economy. The main rationale for es-
tablishing a stabilization fund should be to break this link, and maintain a smoother
fiscal policy through savings in a fund. To a degree, it is perhaps unavoidable that
the existence of stabilization funds may be weakly associated with lower growth of real
government expenditures because many of the oil-rich countries are on a development
trajectory with massive infrastructure needs. According to the World Economic Outlook
10Vegh and Vulent (2013) documents tax-policy procyclicality in developing countries and
acyclicality in developed countries.
11Unfortunately, the panel is unbalanced due to missing data for various countries and due to
the fact that some countries only recently gained independence such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan.
The specifications with institutinal data (ICRG) cover the period 1984-2012)
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data of IMF, for instance, the average nominal GDP per capita between 2005-2008 was
$11,742 for my sample.12. Excluding high per-capita income countries as United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, the average in the sample drops to $5,452. The
ratio of gross-fixed capital investments to GDP was 23.5% between 1990-2008. Therefore,
the objective of the fiscal policy in a developing country might not be achiving a lower
expenditure growth profile, but instead a less volatile one where fiscal expenditures do
not track revenues as closely. While optimal fiscal policy from a Keynesian perspective
prescibes a countercyclical policy and from the Neoclassical point of view, a neutral one,
with tax and expenditure smoothing, there is a growing literature showing that fiscal
policy is actually mostly procyclical in many of the developing countries. I will come
back to this point in Section 3 while discussing our choice of instrumental variables. In
this paper, I also find that procyclicality is the fact for oil-rich countries and investigate
whether those oil-rich countries with a stabilization fund has a ‘less procyclical’ fiscal
policy- which should be one of the objectives of establishing the fund in the first place.
The main data source is International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Out-
look (WEO) and Country Desk Data. I use annual general government expenditures,
however very occasionaly, I rely on central government expenditures when the data is
not available for general government. The same applies for total general government
revenues, and government oil revenues. Data is reported in nominal terms, and I deflate
it using the CPI index from the same database for each country. I extract the oil price
data from IMF’s WEO as well. The data used in my regressions are in detrended logs
using the Hodrick Prescott Filter (except for the ratio of oil revenues to total revenues, oil
prices and institutional variables). Using the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Im, Pesaran
and Shin tests, I find that I can reject the null hypothesis of unit root for the our series i)
detrended real government expenditures, ii) detrendeded real government revenues and
iii) detrended real GDP with 99% confidence level. In order to capture institutional vari-
ables, I use International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data which provides political risk
ratings on democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality, law and order, government
stability and corruption for 140 countries since 1984. However, my results are robust to
inclusion of any institutional variable, and in fact, suprisingly most variables turn out
to have no explanatory power on detrended real government expenditures. The data on
household final consumption, general government consumption and gross fixed capital
formation data are from WDI. All educational attainment variables are by Barro-Lee
12Excluding Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Kazakshtan and Saudi Arabia due to non-existence of
compatible data.
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(2013) and are linearly interpolated.
The first variable of interest is the oil fund dummy which takes on the value of 1 if
there is a sovereign, stabilization or a savings fund in place and 0 otherwise. In this paper,
I do not differentiate between these funds as I consider them to serve mostly to the same
purpose for the set of countries I focus on in the sample. However as explained above, I
am not solely interested in whether the coefficient on the fund dummy is negative, i.e.
pointing out to a ”lower level” of government expenditures. Instead, I am interested
in the coefficient of the interaction term that shows whether the real expenditures are
less procyclical in those countries where there is a stabilization fund, i.e. a statistically
significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term. More formally, I first estimate
the following model:
gi,t = αo + δDi,t + α1yi,t + α2Di,tyi,t + Z
′
i,t,β + ηi + λt + εi,t (3.1)
where gi,t represents detrended real government expenditures, yi,t, detrended real GDP,
Di,t stands for the stabilization fund dummy, Z
′
i,t is the set of other covariates, and ηi,t,
λt are country and year fixed effects. In this setting, the relationship between the fiscal
expenditures and GDP is given by:
∂g
∂y
= α1 + α2ID (3.2)
ID is the indicator function which takes on the value 1 if there is a fund in place and
0 otherwise.
As econometricians, however, we face few challenges in establishing a robust and
sound empirical relationship between the existence of funds and stability of fiscal policy.
As I will explain in more detail in the next section, the endogeneity of GDP and po-
tential reverse causality is a major concern which requires careful instrumental variables
methods. Another crucial challenge is that the decision to adopt a stabilization fund is
not truly exogenous, and countries that run high non-oil deficits might be more tempted
to establish stabilization funds as a self-disciplining mechanism (Ossowski, Villafuerte,
Medas and Thomas; 2008, p.32). In that case, introduction of a fund would seem to
be positively associated with higher fiscal expenditures. Another view suggests that
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countries that set up stabilization funds maybe more prudent to start with, therefore it
would be inappropriate to attribute their good performance to the funds (Shabsigh and
Ilahi;2007, p.4). In that case, a better fiscal outcome would be associated with the un-
observed time invariant factors and not necessarily with the existence of a fund. Under
all cases, OLS would yield biased estimates. While I handle the problem of unobserved
time-invariant and time-variant factors through adopting the fixed effects estimator, ran-
dom effects estimators and Arellano Bond estimators, admittedly it is a challange to find
good instruments which are highly correlated with introduction of fund dummy but not
directly correlated with fiscal expenditures to handle the endogeneity of ‘introducing sta-
bilization fund’ problem.Later in Section 3.3, after I report the main results with respect
to procyclicality, I rely on two possible instruments for the decision to establish a fund
and I find that my results remain robust. Final challenge I face is that the introduction
of an stabilization fund may coincide with the start of a boom in some countries. In that
case oil expenditures might go up tracking high oil revenues and this would again appear
as if the oil fund is associated with higher expenditure growth. I handle this problem
(at least to a degree) by controlling for the ratio of oil revenues to total government
revenues, which measures the governments’ dependence on oil revenues.
I start by running several sets of estimations in Section 3. In the first set, I focus on
the degree of procyclicality and run OLS estimators, ignoring the potential endogeneity
problem. In the second set, I handle the endogeneity problem by using instrumental
variables for GDP. Then I address the other potential endogeneity problems, which are
namely the decision to establish a fund again and institutions. In Section 3.4 I turn to
the question of volatility differences. I measure volatility in terms of moving standard
deviations. In all my regressions in Section 3, I control for the oil dependency (which I
measure as the ratio of oil revenues to total revenues), oil price growth and institutional
quality measures.
111
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Procyclicality of Fiscal Policy
In my paper, I test the degree of procyclicality for oil rich countries first by usual
OLS methods and then use the 2SLS approach as in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007). 13
For each specification, I run two sets of estimations, one for the whole sample of oil-rich
countries, and another for only the countries with stabilization funds, excluding those
which do not have a fund. The rationale is to see whether the procyclicality results differ
when we focus only on the countries with funds. In all my regressions, I use detrended
(log) real government expenditures as the dependent variable and detrended (log) real
GDP, oil dummy, oil price (log) and share of oil revenues in total government revenue
(revenues not detrended) as independent variables. The latter variable is used to control
for the degree of oil-dependency in the economy. I also include WDI’s natural resource
rents as a percent of GDP as another control for oil dependency.14 In testing the degree
of procyclicality across countries with and without stabilization funds, I am interested
in the sign and significance of the following coefficients in equation (1);
∂g
∂y
= a1 for those countries without/before stabilization funds (3.3)
∂g
∂y
= a1 + a2 for those countries with/after stabilization funds (3.4)
Table 3.3 shows first set of results. Using the Fixed Effects, Random Effects and
Arellano Bond estimators, I find in the first panel of Table 3.3 that fiscal policy in
a sample of 29 oil rich countries are on average highly procyclical. The coefficient is
around 0.65-0.73 and highly significant in all specifications using the pooled sample.
The results, however also show that the coefficients of interaction terms are negative and
highly statistically significant, indicating that the government expenditures are associ-
ated significantly less with GDP, i.e. the fiscal policy is acyclical or mildly procyclical in
13Note that in all my instrumental variables estimations, I also instrument for the interaction
term along with the GDP to avoid the “forbidden regression” problem.
14WDI reports total natural resource rents as the difference between the price of a commodity
and the average cost of producing it whereby the unit rents are multiplied with physical quantities.
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those countries where/after there is a stabilization fund for the whole sample. The co-
efficient on the stabilization fund dummy is not statistically significant, indicating that
there is no difference on the level of government expenditures as deviations from the
trend across two groups of countries. Suprisingly, the institutional quality measures are
not significant, except for socioeconomic conditions. The institutional quality measures
in the ICRG dataset are constructed such that higher points indicate better outcomes
and therefore lower risk.15 Hence, the sign of the socioeconomic conditions is indicating
that a higher rating of social conditions (therefore lower social risk) is negatively asso-
ciated with cyclical fiscal expenditures. The insignificance of other institutional quality
measures especially the corruption rating could be due to the fact that in our sample
most countries have similar ratings without significant cross country and time variation
except for Norway whereas there is enough variability in socioeconomic conditions among
the rich income per capita and poor income per capita countries in the sample.
The second panel of Table 3.3 replicates the results for countries only with stabiliza-
tion funds. In all specifications, the coefficients on both the GDP and the interaction
terms are reduced significantly, suggesting that fiscal policy was mildly procyclical be-
fore the establishment of the stabilization funds, and is acyclical or mildly procyclical
after the fund. The statistical significance of the cyclicality coefficients now are not as
significant as in the pooled set of estimations listed in the first panel of Table 3.3, but the
signs are in the expected direction. Institutional quality measures again do not seem to
be statistically associated with the cyclical component of the government expenditures
except for the socio-economic conditions.
The OLS estimates present evidence in favor of stabilization funds. However, as
explained above there is a vast literature on the evidence of government expenditures and
GDP in general being endogenously determined. In order to address the endonegenity
problem, I rely on 2SLS methods, although I believe that the endogeneity problem could
be less severe for the oil-producing countries as opposed to a typical developing country
without a dominant sector based on natural resources. The rationale is as follows: As
Table 2 shows, oil production is the biggest contributor to overall GDP and oil related
exports constitute almost the whole exports in many of those countries. Therefore the
dependency on oil resources makes it more likely that the oil production drives the GDP
as a determinant of government expenditures rather than the other way around. But
nevertheless in order to avoid the risk of biased estimations due to reverse causality, I
15http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG Methodology.aspx
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rely on 2SLS.
To address the endogeneity problem for GDP, I use the instrument suggested by
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), namely the weighted GDP growth of each country’s trade
partners. The authors claim that this is a valid instrument for the GDP growth because
those external shocks should be expected to have no impact on government expenditures
other than their indirect impact through the GDP. Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) show
that the first-stage F statistics are above 10 and the coefficients in the first stage are
highly significant for all groups of countries, except the low income countries. More
specifically, they define the real external shock instrument as:
SHOCKi,t =
EXPi
GDPi
∑
j
ϕi,j,t−1GDPGRj,t (3.5)
Where ϕij,t is the fraction of exports from country i to country j, and EXPi/GDPi
is country i’s average exports expressed as a share of GDP.16 Using the contemporaneous
value and the three lags of the external shocks to instrument the GDP growth, I run
2SLS regressions with country fixed effects. The results are summarized in Table 3.5. The
2SLS estimations (columns 1-4) also confirm that the fiscal policy is overall procyclical
on average in the pooled sample albeit with lower coefficients as compared to the OLS
coefficients. However, as in the OLS case, coefficient on the interaction term is negative
and statistically significant suggesting that the degree of procyclicality falls under the
existence of stabilization funds. More interestingly, the coefficient of the stabilization
fund dummy is negative and significant suggesting that real expenditure growth is lower
on average in countries with funds, an argument that goes in favour of funds. In the
second panel of Table 3.5 (columns 5-8), I replicate the results for countries only with
stabilization funds. Once again, similar to the OLS case, the coefficients on GDP growth
and the interaction term are no longer significant (except for column 5) albeit with
the expected signs. Column 5 shows that among the countries which have stabilization
funds if one does not control for the institutional quality differences, fiscal policy seems
procyclical however, once institutional quality measures are included, procyclicality is no
longer significant in columns to 6-8. In other words, when one excludes the countries that
never adopted such funds, the procyclicality result as well as the reduction effect before
16Jaimovich and Panizza (2007: p.13) suggest that using a time-invariant measure of exports
over GDP would be less subject to real exchange rate fluctuations and domestic factors.
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and after the funds dissappears for those countries which already adopted funds. This
might support the view that those countries which adopted stabilization funds were more
prudent to start with and procyclicality might not have been a serious fiscal problem
initially.
In Table 3.6, I report the first stage results. The first stage F statistics for the
excluded instruments (which test the weak identification of individual endogenous re-
gressors by partialling out the linear projections of remaining endogenous regressors) are
all well above 10. Hansen J statistics suggests that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the
estimated equations. Finally, I run the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test which uses the
difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation with the smaller set of
instruments, where the suspect regressor(s) are treated as endogenous, and one for the
equation with the larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors are treated
as exogenous.17In line with my priors, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the real
GDP growth can actually be treated as exogenous. All first stage statistics point out to
the validity of instruments. Generally speaking, earlier findings of OLS remain robust
albeit with reduced coefficients, there is evidence of procyclical fiscal policy on average
whereas the relationship dissappears when we exclude the countries without funds. The
fact that the evidence for procyclicality dissappears across the pooled and seperate re-
gressions might be suggesting that the countries with funds could be more prudent even
before establishing such funds as the results show that procyclicality was not statisti-
cally significant before or after the establishment. In other words, this might suggest
that stabilization funds themselves are no magic tools and a certain degree of prudence is
needed to achieve more desirable fiscal outcomes as opposed to the view that such funds
necessarily tie the hands of the governments which cannot impose discipline otherwise.
3.3.2 Potential Endogeneity of the “Decision to Establish
a Stabilization Fund”
As discussed in the earlier sections, the decision to adopt a fund might not be truly
exogenous and there might be various of reasons why some countries chose to adopt
17Baum, C.F., Schaffer, M.E., Stillman, S. 2010. ivreg2: Stata module for ex-
tended instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression.
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html
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one, and why some other countries don’t. An example which shows the complications
with respect to establishing a sound empirical link between funds and fiscal performance
is the following: countries that run high deficits might be more tempted to establish
stabilization funds as a self-disciplining mechanism, therefore in a limited time series,
introduction of a fund might appear to be positively associated with higher fiscal ex-
penditures as it might require some moderate time for the fund to be fully operational.
Or countries which already have a tradition of fiscal prudence might be more tempted
to establish funds as a reflection of fiscal accountability and responsibility practises.
However, in that case it would be again wrong to assign causality going from having sta-
bilization funds to achieving more desirable fiscal outcomes especially in a limited time
series. In order to address this endogeneity problem which the previous studies suffer
from, I instrument the decision to establish a stabilization fund. Table 3.4 displays all
the alternative sets of instruments that are employed for the decision to establish oil
stabilization funds.
I contemplate the following hypothesis; a country’s willingness to establish a sta-
bilization fund might increase if there is a growing awareness within the society with
respect to the best use of “people’s resources” -oil endowments in our case. In what
follows, I use two sets of measures to proxy for the awareness. In the first set, I use the
percent of urban population, lags of Barro-Lee’s average years of education and percent
of population with tertiary education.18 The identifying assumption is that urbanization
and lags of educational attainment have an impact on the awareness on the best use of
country resources, but otherwise has no direct effect on the cyclical component of the
contemporary government expenditures. The rationale for urbanization is that informa-
tion and participatory ideas are more accessible in urban areas as opposed to the rural
areas. Urbanization is a very slow process, taking many decades whereas the decision
to establish a fund can even happen overnight. It is hard to imagine that such a slowly
changing indicator might have a direct impact on cyclical expenditures, or visa versa.
One key problem with Barro-Lee educational attainment dataset is that it is missing
for some oil-rich countries, reducing the number of countries available to 20 for the whole
set, and 14 for the sub-sample of countries with funds. So as a robustness check, I explore
an alternative second set for which the data is complete for 24 countries. This alterna-
tive instrument set consists of the interaction of the percent of urban population with
the number of other oil-rich countries which already adopted a stabilization fund. The
18Barro-Lee series are linearly interpolated using Stata’s ipolate command
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reasoning is that the awareness might especially increase if other resource rich countries
have already adopted such funds. This could be because of positive perceptions about
how a fund might help as a buffer-stock, it might be because of following international
organizations “sound policy” prescriptions, it could be due to the transformation in the
economy where a need for new reforms arise, or simply it could be because ‘stabiliza-
tion/sovereign funds are the new global fashion’. This is an alternative instrument which
can also be thought as a proxy for ‘increasing awareness’. In this set of estimations, I
also use ’freedom of press rating’ of the Freedom House. My identifying assumptions
are that i) the number of other oil-rich countries in which there is a stabilization fund
should be purely exogenous for the cyclical component of fiscal expenditures of a country.
In order words, there is no reason to expect that the number of countries with funds
should have an impact on the fiscal expenditures in a country, other than its indirect
impact through affecting the willingness to adopt a fund in the country in question and
ii) higher fraction of population living in urban areas with better access to information
is directly associated with the decision to adopt a stabilization fund, but otherwise it is
exogenous to the cyclical component of government expenditures.
Table 3.7 displays the results of the first set of instruments. In columns 1-3-5-7 the
percent of urban population and 5th lags of educational attainment indicators are used
as instruments for the oil fund, whereas in columns 2-4-6-8, 10th lags of educational
attainment indicators are used. The coefficient estimates are less than those of OLS,
highly significant and showing procyclicality under the absence of funds and acyclicality
or mild countercyclicality under the existence of funds for the whole sample. The second
panel of estimations, displayed in columns 5-8, excludes non-fund countries and shows
the estimations for the countries with funds only. The coefficients of both the GDP and
the interaction terms are now significant at the 10% significance level and again point out
to a acyclical or mildly countercyclical fiscal policy after the establishment of the funds.
None of the institutional quality measures show up as significant. Table 3.8 summarizes
the first stage statistics. Coefficients of the instruments are positive as expected and
statistically significant in general, except for the 10th lag of the tertiary education. F
statistics are above 10, except for column 4 and 8. According to the Wu-Hausman test,
I cannot reject the null hypothesis that oil fund dummy can be treated as exogenous,
and Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistics are also above the Stock-Yogo critical values for 10
percent IV relative bias, again except for column 4 and 8.
As a robustness check, I explore the procyclicality using the second set of instruments
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for the decision to establish funds at Table 3.9. As explained above, I use the interaction
between the number of other oil-rich countries with funds and the urbanization and
freedom of press as instruments. The coefficients as well as the standard errors are
close to the OLS coefficients in Table 3.3 and institutional quality variables are again
not significant. Table 3.10 reports the first stage statistics. All coefficients with respect
to the awareness instrument in the first stage is highly statistically positive (all at 1%
level). The Freedom House ratings assign lower values to free press, and higher values
to not free press.19 Therefore, as expected the sign of our free press indicator is negative
and also statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that more freedom for press
is positively associated the decision to establish a fund. F statistics of the first stages
are high, and the instruments passes the weak instrument tests under all specifications
except for specification 4. Wu-Hausman endogeneity test suggests that I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous variables can actually be treated as
exogenous. Overall, earlier findings remain robust; the government expenditures
are highly procyclical in countries under the absence of stabilization funds
and they are acyclical or mildly countercyclical in countries with such funds.
3.3.3 Endogeneity of the Institutions
In addressing the last of the three endogeneity problems existing in the literature,
I finally attempt to instrument the institutional quality measures. The most common
instrument used widely in the literature are the settler mortality rates between the 17th
and 19th centuries and the latitude, as suggested by Acemolu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001). The settler mortality rates and colonial indicators however do not seem to be
appropriate for my sample of countries because I have a small subset of countries in my
sample (24 with instutional quality data) and mortality data is unfortunately missing
almost for half of the countries in the sample which makes the estimates very imprecise.
Therefore, I search for another variable which has to be correlated with instutional
quality measures of the country in question but should not have a direct impact on the
cyclical component of the government expenditures.
One potential instrument is the lags of average institutional quality measures of the
neighbouring countries for each oil-rich country. The identifying assumption is that
19More specifically, ratings between 0-30 indicate Free Press, 31-60 indicate Partly Free and
61-100 indicate Not Free.
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the instutitions are contagious through trade or regional political agreements and the
lags of the institutional quality measures of the neighbours might have an impact on
the institutions of the country in question, but do not have a direct impact on cyclical
component of the government expenditures. One exception might be military conflict
with neighbours (which the ICRG index accounts for), however, using the lags rather
than the contemporaneous values of the instrument should at least partially address this
concern.
Table 3.12 displays the first stage statistics and Table 3.11 summarizes the 2SLS
findings for the pooled sample and the sub-sample of oil fund countries. As the first
stage results show, the 5th and the 10th lags of the average institutional quality measure
of the neighbours are highly statisticaly significant for both the whole sample and the
sub-sample of countries with stabilization funds only. Statisticaly, the 5th lag of the
neighbours institutions seem to be a better instrument, as the F statistics and the weak
identification tests show, however, as far as the economics is concerned, 10th lag is
more intuitive and more reasonable to address endogeneity concerns as institutions are
very slow changing arrangements. As Table 3.11 shows, even when instrumented, the
instutitional quality measure as proxied by the ICRG composite index shows up as
insignificant. As mentioned before, this might be due to the fact the oil rich countries
with the exception of Norway have similar ICRG ratings. The coefficients of the GDP and
the interaction terms are again similar to the OLS estimates for the whole sample and the
sub-sample as columns 1-4 show. Therefore the findings under instrumenting institutions
also confirm that earlier finding that the fiscal policy is procyclical in countries under
the absence of funds and mildly-procyclical or acyclical in countries with funds.
3.3.4 Treating Both the Fiscal Policy and the Stabilization
Fund as Endogeneous
In this section instead of instrumenting the potentially endogenous real gdp and
the stabilization fund dummy one at a time, I treat both of them as endogenous and
use instruments all at once. Although using multiple instruments are generally not
recommended, I attempt to put both sets of instruments together to check whether the
results are sensitive to treatment of variables of interest as exogenous or endogenous. 20
20See Angrist and Pischke (2009), ”‘Mostly Harmless Econometrics” for a discussion of using
multiple endogenous variables
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In order to keep the analysis and the interpretation simple(r), I treat the institutions
also as predetermined with respect to the fiscal policy.21
The instrument that is used for real gdp growth is once again the external shocks
variable as proposed by Pannizza and Jaimovich (2007) but without any lags.22 As for
the decision to establish a stabilization fund, the instruments I use are the urbanization
rate and the fifth lag of the population with tertiary education as a proxy for awareness
of best use of countries’ resources.23 Table 3.13 displays the first stage statistics and
Table 3.14 summarizes the 2SLS findings for the pooled sample and the sub-sample of
oil fund countries for the two endogenous varaible case.
Starting from the first stage, results show that the coefficients for the instruments
are mostly insignificant for the pooled sample whereas the external shocks seem to signif-
icantly correlate with real GDP growth and the proxy measures for the awareness seems
to be positively and significantly correlated with the decision to establish stabilization
funds for the sub sample. The F test of excluded instruments are sufficiently higher than
the rule of thumb of 10.24 On the other hand, weak identification test point out that
the excluded instruments might be weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors,
although the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics were mostly above the critical points
when the potentially endogenous regressors were instrumented one at a time in the pre-
vious sections. Hansen J statistics suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms.
Despite the possibly weak identification, the second stage results are similar to the
previous sets of estimations: i) for the pooled sample the fiscal policy on average seems
to be mildly counter-cyclical under the existence of funds and, ii) procyclicality does not
seem to be an issue before or after when one looks only at the countries which already
adopted such funds. Although the signs of the coefficients for the sub-sample are as
21The results treating institutions as endogenous along with the former two are similar to
the two endogenous variable case, i.e. treating only the real gdp growth and stabilization fund
dummy as endogenous. The results are available upon request.
22In the case of multiple excluded instruments per each endogenous variable, the number of
clusters turn out to be insufficient to calculate robust covariance matrix, i.e. there are more
regressors than the country clusters.
23Unlike in the previous section, I exclude the average years of education to reduce the number
of instruments due to the restricted number of country clusters which affects the robustness of
covariance matrix for the sub-sample of countries with funds.
24In order to avoid the “ forbidden regression problem” the interaction term is also intrumented
in the first stage.
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expected, they are not statistically significant suggesting that there is no evidence for
fiscal policy procyclicality in countries which adopted funds.
3.3.5 Volatility of Fiscal Expenditures
In this section, I focus on the short term cyclical volatility of various variables, which
I measure by the standard deviation on a rolling window (after removing the trend).
More specifically, I am interested in whether the cyclical volatility of the real household
final consumption, real general government final consumption, real gross fixed capital
formation, real GDP, real general government expenditures and revenues are reduced
in those countries with stabilization funds.25 As the economic theory outlines, business
cycle fluctuations have welfare costs and it is only natural to check whether there is
a difference in volatility between the two groups of countries. I am also interested in
whether short term growth of the variables of interest is more likely to be higher in oil
fund countries. I believe this is important from a developmental perspective: whether
we can argue that “having this buffer of savings” helps countries sustain higher growth
paths. I focus on short term growth, as measured over 3 and 4 years instead of longer
terms because as mentioned before the oil funds are relatively young which restricts the
database from looking into longer horizon.
One way would be to analyze the volatility and growth differentials is to divide the
countries into control and treatment groups on the basis of having a stabilization fund,
estimate volatility and growth for the control group and the treatment groups. This
method however, is problematic due to the nature of the data which does not let me
properly control for the external conditions and shocks that might have affected countries
uniformly over time in a difference in difference approach. This stems from the fact that
since the decision to establish a fund is different for each country in the treatment group,
I do not have a reference date to compute volatility “before” and after” for the control
group.
Hence, my methodology is the following. My focus is short term growth and cyclical
volatility. I estimate moving growth rates and standard deviations of variables of interest
25The data source for real household final consumption, real general government final con-
sumption and real gross fixed capital formation is World Development Indicators and the data
source for real general government expenditures and revenues is WEO and IMF Country Desks.
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over 3 and 4 year windows. In all volatility estimations, variables are measured as
detrended logs except for growth. If oil funds are indeed succesful, I expect to find that
short term growth is higher on average and volatility is reduced in oil fund countries. In
order to measure this, I generate a new binary variable for the oil fund which takes on
the value 1 in the third and correspondingly in the fourth year of the establishment of
the fund. I do not divide the fund countries on the basis of establishment year because
in that case, the estimates for first couple of years would be wrongly attributed to “after
fund” performance. To be more specific, since I am looking at moving rates at 3-4 year
windows, the growth and volatility estimates in the first year of the oil fund in fact
would measure the performance of the last 3 or 4 years when actually there was no
fund in place. Therefore assigning binary variable to the third and fourth years after
establishment would only properly account for the fund period. Following this route, I
provide t-tests of means and present graphical analysis.
I report the findings with respect to short term growth differences in Table 3.15
which presents simple means tests without controlling for various possible covariates.
The first panel shows the differences over 3 year growth performances of key variables
and the second panel shows the 4 year growth differences. In all cases, except for the real
government revenue growth over 3 year windows, the countries with stabilization funds
have statistically significantly higher growth rates. The results indicate that there is no
statistically significant difference between revenue growth for countries with or without
funds but growth rates of gdp, consumption, investments are statistically significantly
higher for those countries with (or after establishing) stabilization funds.
The findings with respect to cyclical volatility differences are reported in Tables 3.16
and 3.17. Simple t tests in Table 3.16 show that volatility of real general government
expenditures, government consumption and real gross fixed capital formation is statisti-
cally significantly lower in countries with stabilization funds, but there is no significant
difference between real household consumption and government revenue volatility across
countries. In Table 3.17, I report the relative standard deviations (relative to GDP)
across countries. Once again, simple t tests show that not only the relative volatility
of real general government expenditures, government consumption and real gross fixed
capital formation are statistically significantly lower in countries with stabilization funds,
but also the relative real household consumption and government revenue volatility.
And finally, I present some graphical analysis in Figures 2 to 11. In Figure 2, I
show the volatility of household final consumption by the age of the oil fund. Figure
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3 shows the volatility in countries that never established oil stabilization funds and
the volatility in those countries before they established funds, so in a way, the second
figure shows the volatility in the “control group”W˙e see in the second figure that the
volatility is dispersed over time even though some non-fund countries indeed managed
to achieve lower consumption volatility. Figures show a disperse consumption volatility
performance across oil fund countries and no-fund countries. Therefore as the means
tests and regressions have shown, graphical analysis also suggest that there does not
seem to be a systematic volatility difference in consumption between countries with and
without funds. What is worth-noting is though that the consumption volatility seems
to be lower on average and more concentrated in a lower band in those countries with
a long history of oil fund. However, these are mainly consisted of top oil producer
and high income per capita countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait
and Oman where consumption risk is lower on average as compared to the rest of the
countries. Therefore it is hard to establish a sound empirical link between the age of the
oil fund and consumption volatility.
Figures 4, 5, 10 and 11 show the volatility of gross fixed capital formation across group
of countries and by the age of oil fund. Gross investment volatility seem to be decreasing
on average for all countries, however, as Figure 4 and 10 show, it has been decreasing
more starkly for countries with oil funds. This is in line with my earlier findings. And
finally, Figures 6-9 show the scatters of volatility of government expenditures between
group of countries over time and by the age of oil fund. In this last case, the pattern is
similar, i.e., overall volatility has been declining on average for all countries, but more
so for countries with funds. Moreover, as in the consumption volatility case, countries
with longer history of oil stabilization funds are more likely to have lower volatility of
government expenditures and consumption.
3.4 Conclusion
The end of 1990s was a period where many oil rich countries started establishing funds
with stabilization purposes in light of fluctuating commodity prices and the boom and
bust cycles associated with it. In a world with perfect insurance markets, we would not
expect to see countries to rely on savings or stabilizations funds. However, the evidence
shows that more and more commodity rich countries joined the club of stabilization-fund-
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owners. Moreover, there is a vast literature following Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh
(2004) showing that the capital inflows to many developing countries are procyclical
whether the recipient country is commodity-rich or not. The problem of boom and bust
cycles is more of a problem for oil rich, or commodity rich countries in general, as the
rising international prices makes borrowing easier, leading to procyclical fiscal policies
while the optimal fiscal policy the economic literature suggests is either counter-cyclical
or acyclical. Under the lack of perfect insurance markets, stabilization funds provide a
mechanism to enforce oil-rich countries to save during good times and use these resources
during contractionary times, making the fiscal policy either countercyclical or acyclical.
Therefore it is an important policy question whether these funds actually help countries
to achieve better fiscal policy outcomes. I believe that the current literature puts too
little emphasis on the impact of stabilization funds on the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
In my paper, I used IMF’s World Economic Outlook Annual Data, World Bank’s
Development Indicators and International Country Risk Guide data for oil-rich countries
between 1980-2012. The task of establishing a sound empirical relationship between the
stabilization funds and fiscal policy performance is not an easy task. First of all, the
decision to establish a fund might not be truly endogenous, i.e. countries with strong
institutions who already have more desirable fiscal policy outcomes might be inclined
to establish funds in the first place. Second the endogeneity between the GDP and the
fiscal policy is an important problem that can lead to biased estimations. Moreover, the
institutions themselves are not truly exogenous. In my paper, I contribute to the existing
literature by addressing all these problems by instrumenting the GDP, the existence of
a stabilization fund (or the decision to establish a fund) and the institutions.
In measuring the impact of the stabilization funds, my main variable of interest is
an interaction term between the GDP and the Fund dummy, as this shows the degree
of cyclicality in countries with funds as compared to countries without funds. In most
of my specifications, either using the detrended GDP or using instruments for GDP, I
find that the fiscal policy is countercyclical but becomes either acyclical or countercycli-
cal after stabilization funds. The instrument that I use for the detrended GDP is the
contemporaneous and three lags of the weighted GDP growth of each country’s trade
partner.I find that the results when the GDP is instrumented are similar to OLS esti-
mations. Running seperate estimations for countries with oil fund only shows that the
procyclicality result statistically dissappears.
Next, I address the problem of the ‘endogenous decision of establishing funds’ by
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introducing several instruments for the fund dummy. All instruments that I use are
aimed to proxy ‘awareness for the best use of country resources’. In the first set of 2SLS
estimations, I use the 5th and 10th lags of linearly interpolated Barro-Lee educational
attainment indicators as well as urbanization. In the second set, I construct a new instru-
ment which is the interaction of the number of other oil-rich countries with funds with
urbanization. I include free press index by Freedom House as an additional instrument.
My identifying assumptions are that the countries that have better informed citizens
(also informed about other countries’ performance and the need for saving) are more
likely to establish funds, but otherwise these instruments are exogenous to the cyclical
component of government expenditures. My first stage results show that these are valid
instruments, and that our second stage results show that the countries with stabilization
funds have either acyclical or midly cyclical fiscal policy.
In order to address the potential endogeneity of the institutions, I construct two new
variables which are the 5th and 10th lags of the average ICRG ratings of neighbouring
countries for each oil-rich country. The identifying assumption is that institutions might
be transmitted through regional trade or political agreements and the lags of the insti-
tutional ratings of the neighbour countries do not have a direct impact on the cyclical
component of the government expenditures. Instrumented or not, I find no evidence
of institutional quality on cyclicality of fiscal policy although all first stage estimations
show that institutional measures have an explanatory power over the decision to establish
stabilization funds.
And finally, I compare the growth performance and volatility performance of real
government expenditures, household final consumption, government consumption and
gross fixed capital formation between the oil-rich countries with and without stabilization
funds over three and four year windows. I use simple means tests in measuring the
growth and volatility performance. I find that the government expenditure, gross fixed
formation growth rates are higher in countries with stabilization funds, whereas these
variables are less volatile. I find no evidence of a statistically meaningful association
between household final consumption and existence of a stabilization fund.
In sum, I find that most stabilization funds indeed serve their purposes rather than
being just another government account. The countries with stabilization funds have fiscal
policy performances with more desirable cyclical properties parallel with the prescriptions
of the optimal fiscal policy literature. However, there is a clear divide in results when I
consider the whole sample or exclude the countries without funds. The countries which
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adopted such funds seem to have less procyclical fiscal policies before and after as opposed
to countries without funds for the whole sample period although degree of procyclicality
seem to decline further after the establishment of the funds. This finding might suggest
that stabilization funds per se are no magic tools and a certain degree of prudence is
needed to achieve more desirable fiscal outcomes as opposed to the view that such funds
necessarily tie the hands of the governments which cannot impose discipline otherwise.
This is in line with the evidence by Frankel et al. (2012) which suggests that those
countries which graduated from fiscal procyclicality into counter or acyclicality are the
ones with better institutions.
The next step for this line of research is to expand the sample to include all commodity-
rich countries rather than just oil-rich countries. There are several countries that are
dependent to minerals and other types of commodity production, as copper is like oil
to Chile and diamonds to Botswana, and some of those countries have successful expe-
rience with stabilization funds. To my knowledge, this line of research is overlooked in
the literature and there is a need for further research.
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Table 3.2: Oil Indicators, 2005-2008
Oil GDP Oil Exports Oil Revenue Stab.
to Total GDP to Total Exports Total Gov. Fund
of Goods Revenue
&Services
Africa
Angola 58.3 94.0 80.4 No
Cameroon 9.6 37.7 33.9 No
Chad 46.1 84.2 61.3 Yes
Republic of Congo 67.1 88.3 83.3 No
Gabon 51.2 80.8 62.4 Yes
Nigeria 37.2 86.2 82.3 Yes
Sudan 18.2 89.4 58.5 Yes
Middle East and Central
Asia
Algeria 44.8 93.7 76.9 Yes
Azerbaijan 52.1 88.8 54.6 Yes
Bahrain 26.3 62.0 79.5 Yes
Islamic Republic of Iran 26.2 76.2 69.6 Yes
Kazakhstan 29.2 56.2 37.9 Yes
Kuwait 57.3 83.5 94.5 Yes
Libya 79.1 95.6 73.9 Yes
Oman 48.5 74.3 84.6 Yes
Qatar 58.5 80.2 62.9 Yes
Saudi Arabia 26.7 84.5 90.3 Yes
United Arab Emirates 35.7 42.3 75.4 Yes
Yemen 32.3 81.3 73.4 No
Asia and Pacific
Indonesia 9.6 9.7 26.8 No
Vietnam n.a. 16.8 28.2 No
Western Hemisphere
Bolivia 6.5 6.3 29.6 No
Ecuador n.a. 53.6 n.a. Yes
Mexico n.a. 15.0 n.a. Yes
Trinidad and Tobago 35.7 50.1 58.8 Yes
Venezuela 34.9 86.9 n.a. Yes
Europe
Russian Federation n.a. 44.7 30.9 Yes
Source: IMF
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Table 3.9: Instrumenting for the Introduction of the Stabilization Fund-All Oil
Rich Countries
Dependent Variable: (Detrended Log) Real Government Expenditures
Instruments:
Columns (1) and (3): Proxy for Awareness (Number of Other Countries with a Fund
Interacted with Urbanization)
Columns (2) and (4): Proxy for Awareness and Freedom of Press Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Stabilization Fund Dummy -0.052 0.010 -0.108 -0.018
(0.054) (0.058) (0.078) (0.087)
Real GDP (detrended log) 0.732*** 0.818*** 0.667*** 0.771***
(0.155) (0.158) (0.178) (0.186)
SF Dummy*Real GDP (detrended log) -0.752*** -0.571*** -0.684*** -0.538**
(0.206) (0.190) (0.210) (0.209)
Oil Prices (in logs) 0.018 -0.001 0.027 0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
Natural Resource Rent 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Oil Revenues in Total -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democratic Accountability 0.001 -0.003
(0.007) (0.008)
Bureaucratic Quality -0.011 -0.006
(0.013) (0.015)
Law and Order -0.007 -0.013
(0.009) (0.014)
Government Stability 0.004 0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Corruption -0.012 -0.006
(0.011) (0.010)
Socioeconomic Conditions -0.006 0.000
(0.004) (0.006)
Observations 433 382 428 377
R-squared 0.200 0.235 0.149 0.213
Number of countries 24 24 24 24
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 3.14: Instrumenting for the Real GDP Growth and the Stabilization Fund
Dependent Variable: (Detrended Log) Real Government Expenditures
Instruments: External Shocks (Panizza and Jaimovich (2007)) and Proxy For Awareness
Column (1): ALL OIL RICH COUNTRIES
Column (2): OIL RICH COUNTRIES WITH FUNDS
(1) (2)
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SLS
Real GDP Growth 0.670*** 0.543
(0.217) (0.613)
SF Dummy*Real GDP Growth -0.625** -0.444
(0.286) (0.672)
Stabilization Fund Dummy -0.024 -0.032
(0.035) (0.034)
ICRG Composite Index 0.005 0.017
(0.008) (0.013)
Oil Prices (in logs) 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Natural Resource Rent 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of Oil Revenues in Total -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Observations 380 273
R-squared 0.086 0.100
Number of countries 20 14
Country Fixed Effects YES YES
Robust standard errors in paranthesis
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 3.15: T-tests of Growth Differences
Mean(Fund=1)(1) Mean (Fund=0) Difference(2)
3 Year Growth
Real Household Final Consumption 0.2001 0.1134 0.0868***
(0.0153) (0.017) (0.0243)
Real Government Final Consumption 0.2376 0.1298 0.1078***
(0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0291)
Real Fixed Gross Capital Formation 0.3753 0.1584 0.2168***
(0.0404) (0.0236) (0.0440)
Real GDP 0.1617 0.1316 0.0301**
(0.0113) (0.0081) (0.0136)
Real General Government Expenditures 0.2064 0.1576 0.0488*
(0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0259)
Real General Government Revenues 0.2367 0.2106 0.0260
(0.0207) (0.0205) (0.0300)
4 Year Growth
Real Household Final Consumption 0.2784 0.165 0.1133***
(0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0300)
Real Government Final Consumption 0.3387 0.193 0.1457***
(0.0271) (0.0245) (0.0375)
Real Fixed Gross Capital Formation 0.5577 0.2281 0.3295***
(0.058) (0.0284) (0.0585)
Real GDP 0.2251 0.1872 0.037**
(0.0153) (0.0107) (0.0181)
Real General Government Expenditures 0.2932 0.2167 0.076**
(0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0330)
Real General Government Revenues 0.3246 0.2983 0.0262
(0.0278) (0.0254) (0.496)
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
(1)Oil Fund dummy takes on the value 1 in the 3rd year (4th for the second panel) of oil fund
(2)Null Hypothesis = Mean Gr.(Fund=1) - Mean Gr.(Fund=0) == 0
(3) Data source for cons. and inv. are WDI and for GDP,
Expenditures and Revenues from WEO and IMF Country Desk
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Table 3.16: T-tests of Volatility Differences
Standard Standard
Dev.(Fund=1)(1) Dev.(Fund=0) Diff.(2)
Volatility over 3 Year Window
Real Household Final Consumption 0.0459 0.0514 -0.0054
(0.0035) (0.003) (0.0047)
Real Government Final Consumption 0.0464 0.0744 -0.0279***
(0.0029) (0.0037 (0.0052)
Real Fixed Gross Capital Formation 0.0782 0.0977 -0.0195***
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0059)
Real GDP 0.0616 0.0547 0.0069
(0.0038) (0.0026) (0.0045)
Real General Government Expenditures 0.067 0.088 -0.0214***
(0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0056)
Real General Government Revenues 0.1130 0.1131 -0.0001
(0.0057) (0.0048) (0.0076)
Volatility over 4 Year Window
Real Household Final Consumption 0.0486 0.055 -0.0063
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0047)
Real Government Final Consumption 0.0502 0.08 -0.0298***
(0.003) (0.0037) (0.0053)
Real Fixed Gross Capital Formation 0.0794 0.0993 -0.0198***
(0.004) (0.0037) (0.0058)
Real GDP 0.0675 0.0579 -0.0095**
(0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0043)
Real General Government Expenditures 0.0712 0.0932 -0.0220***
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0054)
Real General Government Revenues 0.1220 0.1195 0.0005
(0.0066) (0.0041) (0.007)
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
(1)Oil Fund dummy takes on the value 1 in the 3rd year (4th for the second panel) of oil fund
(2)Null Hypothesis = Mean Std.(Fund=1) - Mean Std.(Fund=0) == 0
(3) Data source for cons. and inv. are WDI and for GDP,
Expenditures and Revenues from WEO and IMF Country Desk
(4)All variables are in detrended logs and s.deviations are rolling over 3 and 4 year windows
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Table 3.17: Test of Volatility Differences, Relative to GDP Volatility
Relative Relative
Std.(Fund=1)(1) Std.(Fund=0) Diff.(2)
Volatility over 3 Year Window
Real Household Final Consumption 1.201 1.627 -0.418**
(0.1416) (0.1203) (0.188)
Real Government Final Consumption 1.379 2.582 -1.2032***
(0.119) (0.2181) (0.2875)
Real Fixed Gross Capital Formation 2.336 3.725 -1.388***
(0.1968) (0.279) (0.3812)
Real General Government Expenditures 1.8371 2.9251 -1.088***
(0.1580) (0.2617) (0.3295)
Real General Government Revenues 2.5710 3.9149 -1.3432*
(0.1592) (0.6156) (0.7653)
Volatility over 4 Year Window
Real Household Final Consumption 0.9422 1.1942 -0.2519**
(0.1048) (0.066) (0.1185)
Real Government Final Consumption 1.1467 2.0856 -0.9388***
(0.0912) (0.1073) (0.1549)
Real Fixed Gross Capital Formation 1.747 2.883 -1.1359***
(0.131) (0.1639) (0.2348)
Real General Government Expenditures 1.4732 2.3981 -0.9249***
(0.1039) (0.1198) (0.1720)
Real General Government Revenues 2.2656 3.2264 -0.9608**
(0.1170) (0.3692) (0.4746)
(*), (**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
(1)Oil Fund dummy takes on the value 1 in the 3rd year (4th for the second panel) of oil fund
(2)Null Hypothesis = Mean of Relative Std.(Fund=1)-Mean of Relative Std.(Fund=0) == 0
(3) Data source for cons. and inv. are WDI and for GDP,
Expenditures and Revenues from WEO and IMF Country Desk
(4)All variables are in detrended logs and s.deviations are rolling over 3 and 4 year windows
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Figure 3.2: Volatility of Household Final Consumption in Countries With Funds
(Detrended)
Figure 3.3: Volatility of Household Final Consumption in Countries Without Funds
(Detrended)
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Figure 3.4: Volatility of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Countries With Oil
Funds (Detrended)
Figure 3.5: Volatility of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Countries Without
Funds (Detrended)
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Figure 3.6: Volatility of General Government Expenditures in Countries With Oil
Funds (Detrended)
Figure 3.7: Volatility of General Government Expenditures in Countries Without
Oil Funds (Detrended)
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Figure 3.8: General Government Expenditure Volatility Over Time in Countries
With Funds
Figure 3.9: General Government Expenditure Volatility Over Time in Countries
Without Funds
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Figure 3.10: Investment Volatility by Oil Fund Country
Figure 3.11: Investment Volatility in Countries Without Funds
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